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NOTES
THE LEGITIMACY OF UNITED STATES INTERVENTION IN
NICARAGUA*
CONTEMPORARY BACKGROUND OF NICARAGUAN SITUATION
The overthrow of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua in July 1979
brought to an end an era of extreme oppression and civil strife.' The
Somoza regime survived its final years only by the imposition of a
harsh, military reign of terror. The National Guard, Somoza's security
force, was the aggressive arm of the oppression.2 By mid-June 1979,
foreign states and international organizations were calling for the re-
gime to cede power, and to allow for a peaceful and democratic process
of governmental change.
3
The power base of the rebel Sandinistas was broad and popular.4
The Nicaraguan population, many of whom are peasants and farmers,
5
coalesced in a revolution whose name commemorated an anti-govern-
ment folk hero from the 1920's and 1930's, Augusto Sandino.6 A spirit
of change, agrarian reform, redistribution of wealth and resources, and
improved health characterized the new era.
* This Note reflects factual developments through May 1985.
1. See Russell, Nothing Will Stop This Revolution, TIME, Oct. 17, 1983, at 35. See
generally J. TIERNEY, SOMOZAS AND SANDINISTAS (1982) (subtitled The U.S. and Nicara-
gua in the Twentieth Century) for a detailed account of Nicaragua's recent political
history and its relationship with the United States.
2. N.Y. Times, May 1, 1979, at A7, col. 6; see also Wicker, Reagan's Big Stick, id.,
July 26, 1983, at A21, col. 5.
3. Id., June 24, 1979, at Al, col. 6.
4. See Pastora, Salvaging Nicaragua, id., June 8, 1983, at A23, col. 3; id., Aug. 4,
1979, at A2, col. 6; see also Kinzer, The Beleaguered Revolution, id., Aug. 28, 1983, § 6
(Magazine), at 22.
5. See Chace, In Search of a Central American Policy, id., Nov. 25, 1984, at 49, 51
(Magazine). Nicaragua is an extremely poor country; agriculture and small businesses are
the economic stalwarts. Currently agriculture is the major source of foreign exchange
(hard currency). See infra note 127.
6. Augusto Cesar Sandino organized several hundred Nicaraguan peasants to fight a
United States supported regime. The Army to Defend National Sovereignty battled
United States Marines for six years, until the Marines withdrew in 1933. Sandino was
assassinated after he left a dinner meeting with National Guard Chief Anastasio Somoza
Garcia. See Kinzer, supra note 4, at 24.
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Since the July 1979 overthrow 7 gains in literacy and land reform
have been made, and the general atmosphere of terror has been all but
eliminated, however, overall change has come slowly.8 The Sandinistas
espouse Marxist principles as the underpinnings of their revolution, 9
and have received substantial Cuban and Soviet aid.10 The United
States response to the Sandinistas, which initially included large scale
economic aid, cooled by 1981 as the Reagan administration became
dissatisfied with the Sandinistas' failure to allow a free press and hold
elections." The difficulties the Sandinistas encountered caused several
of the stated objectives of the new regime to be postponed or ignored.
2
7. For a brief chronology of United States-Nicaraguan relations over the past six
years, see N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1985, § 4 (Week in Review), at 1, col. 4.
8. Kinzer, supra note 4, at 67. One commentator has written that the Sandinistas'
policies are damaging the country's economy and creating an agrarian crisis. Leiken, Nic-
aragua's Untold Stories, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 8, 1984, at 16. See Cruz, Nicaragua's Im-
periled Revolution, FOREIGN AFF., Spring 1984. For a brief discussion of Nicaragua's judi-
cial system, see Blodgett, Et al., STUDENT LAW., Feb. 1984, at 10.
For an account of the current state of affairs in Nicaragua by a Peruvian novelist,
see Llosa, In Nicaragua, N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1985, 36, at 36 (Magazine).
9. Kinzer, supra note 4, at 22.
10. Id. at 73. Soviet Help to Sandinistas: No Blank Check, N.Y. Times, Mar. 28,
1984, at Al, col. 2. See also Sandinistas Forcing Thousands Out of War Zone, id., Mar.
19, 1985, at All, col. 1.
11. See President Reagan's address before a joint session of Congress on Apr. 27,
1983, reprinted in DEP'T ST. BULL., June, 1983, at 1, 2 (entitled Central America: De-
fending our Vital Interests) [hereinafter cited as President Reagan's Address].
For further Reagan administration policy statements, see Saving Freedom in Cen-
tral America, (Bur. Pub. Af.) Current Pol. No. 499 (July 1983) (address of President
Reagan to the Int'l Longshoremen's Assoc., Hollywood, FL, July 18, 1983); Building the
Peace in Central America, (Bur. Pub. Aff.) Current Pol. No. 414 (Aug. 1982) (address of
Thomas 0. Enders, Asst. Sec. of State for Inter-American Aff., before the Common-
wealth Club, San Francisco, Cal., Aug. 20, 1982); Struggle for Democracy in Central
America, (Bur. Pub. Aff.) Current Pol. No. 478 (Apr. 1983) (address of Sec. of State
Schultz before the Dallas World Aff. Council and Chamber of Commerce, Dallas, TX,
Apr. 15, 1983); Nicaragua: Threat to Peace in Central America, (Bur. Pub. Aff.) Current
Pol. No. 476 (Apr. 1983) (address of Asst. Sec. Enders before the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, Apr. 12, 1983).
12. See Transcript of President's Speech on Central America Policy, N.Y. Times,
May 10, 1984, at A16. According to President Reagan:
[tihe Nicaraguan junta cabled written assurances to the OAS in 1979 that it
intended to respect human rights and hold free elections. Two years later, these
commitments can be measured by the postponement of elections until 1985; by
repression against free trade unions, against the media and minorities; and-in
defiance of all international civility-by the continued export of arms and sub-
version to neighboring countries.
Caribbean Basin Initiative, (Bur. Pub. Aft.) Current Policy No. 370 (Mar. 1982) (address
of President Reagan before the O.A.S., Wash., DC, Feb. 24, 1982).
President Reagan recently stated at a news conference that the Sandinistas "vio-
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Elections were not held until November 1984,11 and censorship has oc-
curred in the press.'
4
In the past five years two main counterrevolutionary forces have
fought against the Sandinistas. 5 The Contras, among whom are former
Somoza national guardsmen, are attacking Nicaragua's northern re-
gion.16 In the south, rebels led by Eden Pastora, also known as Com-
lated their owi promise to the [O.A.S.] as a result of which they had received support
...that their revolutionary goal was for democracy, free press, free speech, free labor
unions and elections." President's News Conference on Foreign and Domestic Issues,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1985, at A14. See also Chace, supra note 5, at 51.
13. See Nicaragua Installs Elected Assembly, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1985, at A3, col.
1; Sandinistas Win 63 Percent of Vote in Final Tally, id., Nov. 15, 1984, at A9, col. 1;
Sandinistas Hold Their First Elections, id., Nov. 5, 1984, at A12, col. 1; Elections in
Nicaragua: The Parties and the Candidates, id., col. 3; The Nicaraguan Vote, id., col 1;
Half-step to democracy, ECONOMIST, Nov. 10, 1984, at 13; Nicaragua: A Referendum
More than an Election, id., at 46.
14. See Russell, supra note 1, at 37. Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, former editor of La
Prensa, recently left Nicaragua because of his frustration over the political situation and
censorship. "The range of news items, international information, editorials and photo-
graphs covered by censorship is simply unbelievable .... [I]f we had a full year at the
present number of pages, La Prensa could not publish all the material that has been
censored during the past three years." Nicaraguan Urges U.S. to Rein in Rebels, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 4, 1985, at A3, col. 4.
15. See, e.g., Central America: The Second Spanish Civil War, ECONOMIST, Oct. 29,
1983, at 33. Repeated efforts have been made to consolidate the Nicaraguan opposition.
This may occur in the future. See Brinkley, Leaders of Anti-Sandinistas Form Alliance
Urged by U.S., N.Y. Times, Mar. 1, 1985, at A8, col. 1.
16. The Nicaraguan Democratic Force is a United States-backed counterrevolution-
ary group waging war against the Sandinistas from Honduras. See Schlender, Rebel Rift:
Nicaraguan Exile Units Feud With Each Other As Well As Sandinistas, Wall St. J.,
July 27, 1983, at 1, col 1. One report stated: "It is true that around 4,000 members of the
abominable ex-President Somoza's national guard have been camped along the border
since 1979." ECONOMIST, July 28, 1994, at 13.
Nicaraguan Indians also form a large part of the anti-Sandinista guerrillas; most are
Miskito Indians. Various groups have been formed, including Misurasata (a group led by
Brooklyn Rivera, headquartered in Costa Rica, which claims that its goals are not coun-
terrevolutionary, but merely to secure land rights and autonomy), and Misura (a group
led by Steadman Fagoth, based in Honduras, which does seek to replace the Sandinista
Government). Kennedy, Support the Peace Effort of Nicaragua's Indians, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 27, 1984, at A31, col. 1.
According to Senator Kennedy, the Indian groups have good reasons for fighting the
Sandinistas; although he does support a recent peace initiative by Rivera:
One reason such negotiations are important is that the Sandinistas' treatment of
the Indians continues to be unconscionable. One-third to one-half of the 90,000
Indians on the coast have been displaced. Some 20,000 have fled to Honduras to
escape the Sandinistas' scorched-earth policy-the razing of villages along the
Rio Coco-and 10,000 are confined in resettlement camps in the central coast
area. Most disturbing of all, 3,000 to 5,000 have lived for two years in intolerable
conditions in forced-labor camps-which resemble concentration camps-in the
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mander Zero, have pressed a separate attack.1 7 Both groups seek to
destabilize the Sandinistas. The Contras wish to gain power and estab-
lish a non-Marxist society, while the rebels of the south seek to oust
the ruling Sandinista junta for betraying the democratic principles
originally stated as guiding the revolution.18
International reaction and attempts to influence the development
of the Nicaraguan situation are varied. To some observers the conflict
is the classic East-West confrontation, a communist inspired uprising
in a traditionally capitalistic society.1 9 To others the revolution is a
local response to an oppressive feudal society, which failed to ade-
quately take care of its peasant population."0
The purpose of this note is to examine the United States actions
and policies with respect to Nicaragua, and to determine their legiti-
macy under principles of international law. Furthermore, the note will
examine the actions and policies of Nicaragua in Central America and
assess their legitimacy under principles of international law.
CLAIMS AND ACTIONS OF THE PARTIES
The role of the United States in Central America and in Nicaragua
raises a wide range of international and domestic legal concerns, and is
supported with a variety of foreign policy rationales. The primary
mountainous Matagalpa-Jinotega area, where they pick coffee beans for the
state.
Id.
17. Id. Eden Pastora was a major figure in the Sandinista revolution and was for-
merly Deputy Defense Minister. He left Nicaragua in 1981 and publicly declared his
opposition to the Sandinista directorate in 1982. See Pastora, supra note 4. Pastora now
leads the Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (A.R.D.E.). Commander Zero argues that
the Sandinista regime has betrayed the democratic ideals of the revolution; he seeks
genuine democratic change. Id. Pastora was injured in a bomb blast in 1984, and subse-
quently his leadership role in the Social Democratic Movement was questioned due to
his refusal to consolidate with other rebel forces. See N.Y. Times, June 14, 1984, at 4,
col. 3; id., June 1, 1984, at A4, col. 3.
18. See Pastora, supra note 4. It has also been asserted that A.R.D.E. has sought a
settlement in southern Nicaragua for two reasons: "to secure a toehold on the jungle
fringes of Nicaraguan territory as the first step toward winning international recognition
as a contra provisional government, and to win a port of entry for military supply."
Mysterious Help from Offshore?, TmE, Apr. 23, 1984, at 22. This goal of recognition of
the Contras is related to their claim of self-determination rights. See infra note 48.
19. See Safire, Choosing Up Sides, N.Y. Times, July 24, 1983, at E21, col. 1; see
generally President Reagan's Address, supra note 11.
20. See Kinzer, supra note 4, at 24. For a thorough account of the Sandinista revolu-
tion, see G. BLACK, THE TRIUMPH OF THE PEOPLE: THE SANDINISTA REVOLUTION IN NICA-
RAGUA (1981).
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claim raised by the United States to support its interventionist role2 1 is
that international communism is besieging Central America, and that a
response to the Nicaraguan situation is a response to Cuban, Soviet
and East European subversion.2" Proponents of this theory perceive
dual forces at work in Nicaragua. The first is anti-capitalism. Interna-
tional communism and subversion, under the broad specter of the
Brezhnev doctrine,2 are viewed as expanding without regard to na-
tional boundaries.2 4 The presence of Cuban advisors in Nicaragua, esti-
mated at one time to be roughly 8,000, supports this claim. 25 The sec-
ond force is both social and cultural. Nicaragua's harsh history of
poverty and oppressive government has created a situation where in-
ternal strife and rebellion are expected."' It is here, according to the
United States claim, that the international Marxist network is ready to
exploit local conditions ripe for political and civil change.
A second United States claim is based on collective security. 7 The
United States believes it must act definitively to protect El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras and Costa Rica from rebel forces and to help
preserve the structures of democracy in Central America.28 This posi-
tion reflects an underlying belief in the domino theory, which asserts
that communist rule in Nicaragua will lead to rebel gains in El Salva-
dor, thereby encouraging rebel forces elsewhere in Central America.29
21. See infra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
22. See President Reagan's Address, supra note 11, at 3; see also Enders, Nicaragua:
Threat to Peace in Central America, 6 DEP'T ST. BULL., June 1983, at 76.
23. The Brezhnev doctrine states that international communism is governed by the
laws of the class struggle and social development rather than national sovereignty. See
M. McDoUGAL & W. REISMAN, infra note 57, at 175-79. One columnist has written the
following: "The Brezhnev doctrine-holding, in effect, that once a country has gone
Communist other Communist countries have a right to keep it that way-was put for-
ward in 1968 after Warsaw Pact nations intervened in Czechoslovakia, where the doc-
trine could be enforced." Wicker, A Bone in his Throat, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1985, at
A27, col. 1. See also Rostow, Law and the Use of Force by States: The Brezhnev Doc-
trine, 7 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 209 (1980-81).
24. See Podhoretz, Military Intervention in Central America?, N.Y. Times, July 24,
1983, at E21, col. 5.
25. See Kissinger Report, infra note 168, at 30.
26. See Mercado, What Nicaragua Wants, N.Y. Times, July 26, 1983, at A21, col. 1.
Sergio Ramirez Mercado, a novelist, was a member of the former Nicaraguan Junta of
National Reconstruction. Id.
27. See President Reagan's Address, supra note 11, at 5; Rostow, Adhering to World
Law, N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 1983, at A25, col. 1. See also Central America at the Cross-
roads, DEP'T ST. BULL., Jan. 1980, at 58, 63 (former Assistant Secretary for Inter-Ameri-
can Affairs Vaky's statement before the House Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs
on Sept. 11, 1979).
28. See President Reagan's Address, supra note 11, at 5.
29. See Vaky, supra note 27, at 58.
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It is also a response to requests for aid from the Central American
regimes.
Another charge proffered by the United States is that the Nicara-
guan Sandinista Government is an illegal government, since it is not an
elected democratic government.3 0 Nicaragua's failure to hold prompt
elections was viewed as an authoritarian abuse of power and a denial of
the inherent duty to establish democratic government."1 Despite the
occurrence of elections in November 1984, confirming the present
Sandinista leadership, the United States viewed Nicaragua's elections
as a sham.32
A further charge synthesizes the above claims. The United States
believes that for reasons of political exigency direct action is required
to preserve the present Inter-American system.33 The United States
30. See President Reagan's Address, supra note 11, at 3; see also Rostow, supra note
27.
31. See Enders, U.S. Secretary in Central America, DEP'T ST. BULL., June 1983, at 75
(statement of Ambassador Enders, then Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs,
before the House Subcommittee on Hemisphere Affairs delivered on Mar. 1, 1983). See
also Shultz, Comprehensive Strategy for Central America, DEP'T ST. BULL., Sept. 1983,
at 45 (Secretary of State Shultz's prepared statement before the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee on Aug. 4, 1983).
32. See supra note 7. The elections have received varied appraisals. One commenta-
tor, an election observer project director of the Int'l Human Rights Law Group, stated
that despite several flaws, the elections did give Nicaraguans an opportunity to be heard.
"Virtually all the independent observers who prepared comprehensive reports of the Nic-
araguan elections concluded that the elections represented a positive political develop-
ment and compared favorably with the 1984 elections in El Salvador." Letter of Larry
Garber to the Editor, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1985, at A26, col. 5. See also Letter from L.
Whitman to the Editor, id., Nov. 16, 1984, at A30, col. 3. The writer observed the elec-
tions as part of the Nicaragua-Honduras Education Project and concluded that they
were "free, fair and hotly contested." Whitman wrote that during an interview with M.
Joyce, counsel for political affairs in the United States Embassy in Nicaragua, Joyce
stated that the elections were flawed because of the lack of meaningful choice. Id.
One author has criticized the election process because Auturo Cruz, the opposition
candidate who might have posed the greatest challenge to the Sandinistas, didn't partici-
pate. This author believes that political maneuvering led to the break in negotiations
prior to the election, thereby depriving the opposition of its potent and unifying force.
See Chace, supra note 5, at 51. For other accounts, see Cooper, infra note 38, at 26
(comparing the Nicaraguan and Salvadoran elections); NAT'L LAW. GUILD, NICARAGUA: AN
EYEWITNESS REPORT ON THE ELECTION PROCESS (1984).
33. See Enders, supra note 31, at 75. See also President Reagan's letter to prominent
Venezuelan citizens regarding the threats to world peace posed by the Nicaraguans and
the current situation in Central America and the Caribbean, reprinted in World Peace
and the Situation in Central America and the Caribbean, DEP'T ST. BULL., Jan. 1983, at
81. For further amplification of this point in relation to the recent Grenada invasion, see
Letter to the Editor from Peter Rashish, N.N. Times, Nov. 6, 1983, at E2, col. 4 (enti-
tled Of Grenada and the Right of a Great Nation).
Secretary of State Shultz said recently in a speech entitled "America and the Strat-
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position is that any communist government in the Western Hemi-
sphere is inimical to the Pan-American system. This claim has a broad
ideological foundation, reminiscent of the Monroe Doctrine, that no
Russian or European interference will be tolerated in the Western
Hemisphere.3 4 Underlying this position is the belief that Nicaragua's
revolution is inspired and supported primarily by external rather than
internal forces.35
A final United States claim is that Nicaragua is a flow point for
arms to Salvadoran and other rebels.36 United States objectives, ac-
cording to President Reagan, are to stop the flow of arms,"7 and to
egy for Freedom":
Central America's hopes for peace, security, democracy, and economic pro-
gress will not be realized unless there is a fundamental change in Nicaraguan
behavior in four areas:
First, Nicaragua must stop playing the role of surrogate for the Soviet
Union and Cuba. As long as there are large numbers of Soviet and Cuban secur-
ity and military personnel in Nicaragua, Central America will be embroiled in
the East-West conflict.
Second, Nicaragua must reduce its armed forces, now in excess of 100,000,
to a level commensurate with its legitimate security needs-a level comparable
to those of its neighbors. The current imbalance is incompatible with the re-
gional stability.
Third, Nicaragua must absolutely and definitively stop its support for insur-
gents and terrorists in the region. All of Nicaragua's neighbors, and particularly
El Salvador, have felt the brunt of Sandinista efforts to destabilize their govern-
ments. No country in Central America will be secure as long as this continues.
And fourth, the Sandinistas must live up to their commitments to demo-
cratic pluralism made to the O.A.S. in 1979. The internal Nicaraguan opposition
groups, armed and unarmed, represent a genuine political force that is entitled
to participate in the political processes of the country. It is up to the Govern-
ment of Nicaragua to provide the political opening that will allow their
participation.
N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1985, at A4, col. 1.
34. For a discussion of the Monroe Doctrine in the contemporary context, see Note,
The Monroe Doctrine in the 1980's: International Law, Unilateral Policy, or Ativistic
Anachronism?, 13 CASE W. RES. J. tNT'L L. 203 (1981). See also A Revival in Washington
for the Monroe Doctrine, N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1984, at A8, col. 1.
35. The difficulty in categorizing a conflict or threat as "internal" or "external" un-
derlies much of the discussion on intervention. For commentary on this theme, see IN-
TERNAL WAR: PROBLEMS AND APPROACHES (H. Eckstein ed. 1980); G. Kelley & L. Miller,
Internal War and International Systems: Perspectives on Method (1969). See also Salva-
dor Arms-Aid Charges Detailed, N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1984, at A3, col. 1 (report on dis-
closure of evidence, including aerial photography, establishing that Salvadoran rebels get
"most of their weapons, ammunition and equipment from Soviet-bloc nations through
Nicaragua").
36. See Salvador Arms-Aid Charges Detailed, supra note 35.
37. See President Reagan's Address, supra note 11, at 3. Former Ambassador Kirk-
patrick has argued vehemently that Nicaragua supplies arms to Salvadoran rebels. See
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pressure the Sandinistas to change their Marxist orientation and im-
plement democratic and capitalist policies.3 8 To fulfill this objective
various military actions have been employed. Training soldiers 9 and
building bases in Honduras, 0 mining Nicaraguan harbors,'4 1 providing
Address by Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, United States Permanent Representative
to the United Nations, at the Am. Soc. Int'l Law Annual Meeting, Wash., DC, Apr. 12,
1984. This position has been questioned by David MacMichael, a former C.I.A. analyst.
Nicaragua, Pro and Contra, N.Y. Times, June 18, 1984, at A18, co1 . 1 (Editorial) (Mac-
Michael claims that Nicaraguan involvement has been systematically misrepresented).
See also In From the Cold and Hot for Truth, id., June 11, 1984, at B6, col. 3 (quoting
MacMichael's assessment of the arms dispute); MacMichael, Democrats Can Seize Cen-
tral America Issue, id., July 17, 1984, at A21, col. 1.
38. President Reagan recently stated in response to a question whether the overthrow
of the Sandinistas was his goal: "Well, remove it in the sense of its present structure, in
which it is a Communist, totalitarian state and it is not a Government chosen by the
people . . . you wonder sometimes about those who make . . . claims as to its legiti-
macy." President's News Conference, supra note 12.
One form of pressure that has been applied by the United States is to send spy
planes over Nicaraguan air space and have them break the sound barrier, causing sonic
booms. This tactic was used repeatedly in November 1984-it is said to have caused
great apprehension in Nicaragua. See Cooper, Nicaragua: Waiting for Uncle Sam, VIL-
LAGE VOICE, Nov. 27, 1984, at 25.
39. The United States effort has included training soldiers from Honduras, Guate-
mala and El Salvador, as well as Contras. A recent controversy has erupted over the use
of a C.I.A. guerrilla manual, which counseled assassination and efforts to overthrow the
Sandinistas. The House Intelligence Committee concluded that the manual for Nicara-
guan rebels violated the Boland amendment, which forbids United States personnel to
participate in any effort to overthrow the Nicaraguan Government. House Panel Calls
C.I.A. Manual Illegal, N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1984, at A3, col. 4. See Excerpts From Primer
for Insurgents, id., Oct. 17, 1984, at A12, col. 4 (the C.I.A. manual is entitled, PSYCHO-
LOGICAL OPERATIONS IN GUERRILLA WARFARE); Letter of William Casey (Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence) to the members of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees, Oct.
25, 1984, reprinted in N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1984, at A3, col. 1; C.I.A. Chief Defends Man-
ual for Nicaraguan Rebels, id., col. 3.
One commentator, Prof. Francis Boyle, wrote that the C.I.A. use of the war manual
violated standards long held by the United States Government. He stated that the tech-
niques the C.I.A. approved-e.g., political assassination-violate the law of war. See U.S.
ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, para. 31 (1956). "According to
paragraph 501, any U.S. Government official who had actual knowledge, or should have
had knowledge," of "war crimes" (as defined by para. 499) and failed to take measures to
ensure compliance with the law of war "is similarly guilty of a war crime." Letter from
Francis Boyle to the Editor, N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1984, at 22, col. 5.
40. See Gerth, Ex-U.S. Intelligence and Military Personnel Supply Anti-Nicaragua
Rebels, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1983, at A12, col. 1; see also Smith, U.S. Presence Provokes
Misgivings in Honduras, id., Feb. 9, 1984, at A18, col. 1.
41. Officials Say C.I.A. Made Mines With Navy Help, N.Y. Times, June 1, 1984, at
A4, col. 3; Soviet Tells Details of Sea Blast Off Nicaragua, id., Mar. 23, 1984, at A6, col.
3; Rebel Boats Battle Nicaraguans at Port, id., Mar. 31, 1984, at A4, col. 1; Nicaraguan
in U.N. Protest, id., col 3; Soviet Tanker Damaged by Mine Laid by Rebels in Nicara-
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military hardware to Guatemala and El Salvador,' positioning United
States warships off the Nicaraguan coast 4s and providing covert aid to
Nicaraguan guerrillas are the major actions taken so far.
44
In contrast to the United States assertions, Nicaraguan claims in-
clude an invocation of the time honored, but often ignored, principle of
nonintervention,'45 the right to revolution 4 and social change, the invi-
guan Port, id., Mar. 21, 1984, at A4, col. 3 (reporting damage to Soviet, Dutch and Pana-
manian ships); Nicaraguan Port Thought to be Mined, id., Mar. 16, 1984, at A3, col. 1
(detailing damage to foreign vessels); Britain Criticizes Mining of Harbors Around Nica-
ragua, id., Apr. 7, 1984, at Al, col. 1 ("Since March 1 vessels from the Soviet Union,
Japan, the Netherlands, Panama, Liberia and Nicaragua have been damaged by the
mines"); Senate, 84-12 Acts to Oppose Mining Nicaraguan Ports, id., Apr. 11, 1984, at
Al, col. 5; Mexico Hits U.S. For Barring Court in Mining Case, Wash. Post, Apr. 14,
1984, at A14, col. 2; U.S. Reasons for Mining Challenged, id., col. 3 (discussion of mining
in context of international law).
42. See Chavez, U.S. Envoy Castigates Salvadorans on Terrorism, N.Y. Times, Nov.
26, 1983, at A4, col. 3.
43. Military Experts Call U.S. Ready for Latin Combat Role if Order is Given, id.,
Apr. 23, 1984, at A8, col. 1.
44. See Cohen, The New Phase in the U.S. War Against Nicaragua, Blind Justice,
Oct. 1983, at 5 (Blind Justice is the newspaper of the New York Chapter of the National
Lawyer's Guild). See also Russell, supra note 1, at 35; Kinzer, supra note 4, at 5;
Threats by C.I.A. Said to Influence Anti-Sandinistas, N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 1984, at Al,
col. 4; Key C.I.A. Role Seen in Policies on Nicaragua, id., Apr. 20, 1984, at Al, col. 5;
C.I.A. and the Rebels: A Tangled History, id., Mar. 18, 1985, at A8, col. 4.
The extent of United States aid to the Contras between 1981 and 1984 has been
estimated at $80 million. Cody, Contras Press for Funds, Wash. Post, Feb. 18, 1985, at
Al, col. 1.
In addition to aid from public funds, private efforts have been undertaken by Amer-
ican and other donors to aid the Contras. This assistance is estimated at $5 million. Id.
According to one account:
A Nicaraguan guerrilla leader has claimed that the rebels are getting about
$1.6m a month, much of it given by individuals and companies in the United
States. The money is funnelled through organisations usually registered outside
the United States but with resoundingly humanitarian-sounding names and with
mailbox addresses in, for instance, Miami.
EcONOMIST, Sept. 22, 1984, at 34.
Critics of the United States policy have stated that private aid may violate the Neu-
trality Act, 18 U.S.C. § 960 (1982), see infra notes 87-89 and accompanying text. Fur-
thermore, reports in the press that the United States has encouraged Asian countries
and Israel to serve as conduits for United States aid also may affect the figure of total
aid to the Contras, and raise questions regarding the circumvention of Congressional
appropriations limitations. See also Taubman, Letting Citizens Give Rebels Aid was
U.S. Policy, N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1984, at Al, col. 5.
For a chronological summary of United States claims and actions in the dispute, see
id., Apr. 12, 1984, at A10, col. 2.
45. See M. DE VRs & J. RODRIGuEz-NovAs, THE LAW oF THE AMEucAs 64 (1965).
46. Id. at xi.
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olability of state sovereignty," the right to self-determination free from
outside interference," and a claim of legitimacy based on fundamental
improvements in education, the cessation of violence, political stability
and popular support as evidenced by elections.
49
These claims are related in the sense that the Sandinistas believe
themselves to be the legitimate government of Nicaragua, entitled to
the same rights and freedoms as other national sovereign govern-
ments.50 Inherent in this position is the understanding that no external
government or coalition has the right to interfere with Nicaragua's do-
mestic economic, political and cultural institutions or its right to self-
defense.5
Nicaragua's actions have included building a military establish-
ment,52 accepting Cuban and Soviet military and cultural aid, and pro-
47. See Mercado, supra note 26.
48. Id. In a recent article Daniel Ortega Saavedra, Nicaragua's President, stated that
the United States effort to support the Contras is "illegal," "immoral," "futile and un-
necessary," and "counterproductive." Saavedra, Why the U.S. Must End its War, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 13, 1985, at A23, col. 1. He maintained that the United States claim of
regional self-defense is without justification in light of the lack of solid evidence pro-
duced to support the claim; that the withdrawal from the I.C.J. in the recent case estab-
lished that the United States ignores international law; that Nicaragua's recent election
was fair and points out the role of political pluralism in Nicaraguan politics; and that
emergency actions have been taken in response to United States pressures, not for politi-
cal suppression. Id. He stated:
President Reagan calls us "totalitarian" because we imposed a state of emer-
gency that restricts certain rights, including press freedom with regard to mili-
tary and security matters. The state of emergency was imposed in 1982 in direct
response to the covert war. If Mr. Reagan really wants the full restoration of
political and civil rights, he need only stop the war. My Government is commit-
ted to lifting the state of emergency and restoring full press freedom and other
rights as soon as that occurs.
Id.
The principle of self-determination has also been raised by the Contras and Nicara-
gua's various Indian groups. These anti-Sandinistas claim that Government failure and
betrayal with regard to its democratic promises have created a right to dissent. They also
claim that abuses by the Sandinistas, especially in regard to the Miskito Indians, see
Letter from F.R. Whittlesey to the Editor, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1984, at A22, col. 3,
legitimate self-determination efforts, including guerrilla warfare, to force the Sandinistas
to change course.
49. See Mercado, supra note 26.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Brinkley, Nicaraguan Army: 'War Machine' Or Defender of a Besieged Nation?,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1985, at Al, col. 2; Rohter, Sandinistas Pin Hopes on Congress, id.,
Mar. 3, 1985, § 4 (Week in Review), at C1, col. 1 ("That Nicaragua has become heavily
militarized is not in dispute. The Sandinista People's Army has grown from a ragged
guerrilla band of 6,000 to a disciplined force of more than 60,000 soldiers armed with
large quantities of weapons and equipment, much of it purchased in Eastern Europe.
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viding assistance to rebels in neighboring countries.5 3 The extent of aid
provided by Nicaragua to rebel insurgents in El Salvador, Honduras
and Guatemala is disputed, but undoubtedly some aid has been
given.
5 4
APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Several major principles of international law are applicable to the
United States and Nicaraguan claims and actions. These include inter-
vention and the doctrine of nonintervention;5 5 aggression,5" self-de-
More than 40 percent of this year's budget is earmarked for the military"). See Halloran,
U.S. Officers Play Down Moves in Nicaragua, id., Nov. 10, 1984, at A4, col. 1 (assessing
the size, components and capability of Nicaragua's forces).
53. See Kissinger Report, infra note 168, at 30, 113.
54. See supra note 37.
55. For general discussions on the topic of intervention and nonintervention, see gen-
erally R. BARNET, INTERVENTION AND REVOLUTION (1968); F. DELIMA, INTERVENTION IN IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW (1971); HIGHAM, INTERVENTION OR ABSTENTION (1975); LAW AND CIVIL
WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD (J. Moore ed. 1974); W. PERKINS, CONSTRAINT OF EMPIRE:
THE UNITED STATES AND CARIBBEAN INTERVENTIONS (1981); Bond, A Survey of the Nor-
mative Rules of Intervention, 52 MILITARY L. REV. 51 (1971); Cabranes, Human Rights
and Non-Intervention in the Inter-American System, 65 MICH. L. REV. 1147 (1967);
Douglass, Counterinsurgency: A Permitted Intervention, 25 MILITARY L. REV. 43 (1964);
Editorial Comment, Has the Specter of Intervention Been Laid in Latin America, 50
AM. J. INT'L L. 636 (1956) (C.G. Fenwick); Editorial Comment, Intervention and the In-
ter-American Rule of Law, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 873 (1959) (C.G. Fenwick); Editorial Com-
ment, Intervention-At the Caracas Conference, 48 AM. J. INT'L L. 451 (1954) (C.G. Fen-
wick); Falk, The United States and the Doctrine of Nonintervention in the Internal
Affairs of Independent States, 5 HOWARD L. J. 163 (1959); Farer, Intervention in Civil
Wars: A Modest Proposal, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 266 (1967); Friedman, Intervention, Civil
War and the Role of International Law; 59 Am. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 67 (1965); Gilmour,
The Meaning of "Intervene" Within Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter-An
Historical Perspective, 16 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 330 (1967); Kane, American Involvement
in Latin American Civil Strife, 61 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 58 (1967); Moore, The Con-
trol of Foreign Intervention in Internal Conflict, 9 VA. J. INT'L L. 205 (1969); Puente,
The Doctrines of Recognition and Intervention in Latin America, 28 TUL. L. REV. 313
(1954); Schwenniger, The 1980s: New Doctrines of Intervention or New Norms of Non-
intervention, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 423 (1981); Thomas, The Organization of American
States and Subversive Intervention, 55 Am. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 19 (1961); Thomas &
Thomas, Non-Intervention and the Spanish Civil War, 61 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 2
(1967); and Wright, Intervention, 1956, 51 AM. J. INT'L L. 257 (1957).
56. Aggression and acts of aggression have been the subject of attempted definitions
for many years. One such attempt occurred in 1933. Following the lead of the Conference
for the Reduction of and Limitations of Armaments at Geneva, Maxim Litvinov, the
Russian Commissar for Foreign Affairs, raised the issue in two Soviet "Conventions for
the Redefinition of Aggression." The Litvinov conventions yielded in part the following
text:
[Tihe aggressor in an international conflict shall, subject to the agreements in
force between the parties to the dispute, be considered to be that State which is
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fense5 7 and collective security;5" customary principles of Inter-Ameri-
can law;59 the right to revolution ° and self-determination;6 ' and the
the first to commit any of the following actions:
1. Declaration of war upon another State;
2. Invasion by its armed forces with or without a declaration of war, of the
territory of another State;
3. Attacks by its land, naval or air forces, with or without a declaration of war,
on the territory, vessels, or aircraft of another State;
4. Naval blockade of the coasts or ports of another State;
5. Provision of support to armed bands formed in its territory which have in-
vaded the territory of another State, or refusal. ., to take. . all the mea-
sures in its power to deprive those bands of all assistance or protection.
See R. LANGER, SEIZURE OF TERRITORY 73-74 (1947).
The applicable provision of the Rio Treaty regarding aggression is article 9, which
provides:
In addition to other acts which the Organ of Consultation may characterize
as aggression, the following shall be considered as such:
a. Unprovoked armed attack by a State against the territory, the people, or
the land, sea or air forces of another State;
b. Invasion, by the armed forces of a State, of the territory of an American
State, through the trespassing of boundaries demarcated in accordance with a
treaty, judicial decision, or arbitral award, or, in the absence of frontiers thus
demarcated, invasion affecting a region which is under the effective jurisdiction
of another State.
Rio Treaty, infra note 65, art. 9.
57. The doctrine of self-defense is a fundamental principle in any legal system that
outlaws acts of aggression. For a general discussion of aggression and self-defense, see M.
McDOUGAL & W. REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 964-98
(1981).
58. Collective security is one of the founding principles of the United Nations and
the Organization of American States. See generally A. GOLBERT & Y. NUN, LATIN AMERI-
CAN LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 111-29 (1982). See also the relevant provisions of the O.A.S.
Charter:
Article 24
Every act of aggression by a State against the territorial integrity or the
inviolability of the territory or against the sovereignty or political independence
of an American State shall be considered an act of aggression against the other
American States.
Article 25
If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or po-
litical independence of any American State should be affected by an armed at-
tack or by an act of aggression that is not an armed attack, or by an extra-
continental conflict, or by a conflict between two or more American States, or by
any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America, the Ameri-
can States, in furtherance of the principles of continental solidarity or collective
self-defense, shall apply the measures and procedures established in the special
treaties on the subject.
O.A.S. CHARTER, infra note 64.
59. See C.G. FENWICK, THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (1963). Fenwick iden-
tifies and discusses the following principles underlying the Inter-American system: equal-
60. Footnote 60 appears at p. 147.
61. Footnote 61 appears at p. 147.
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United States Neutrality Act."2 Furthermore, various treaties and in-
ternational agreements, e.g., the United Nations Charter, 3 the Charter
of the Organization of American States,6 ' the Rio Treaty 5 and the
ity of states, the rule of law, pacific settlement, nonrecognition of territorial conquest,
nonintervention, self-determination, the promotion of representative democracy, respect
for human rights, an attack against one is an attack against all, and general responsibil-
ity for the raising of living standards. Id. at 43-67. Other commentators have discussed
the Inter-American legal system. See, e.g., Barnes, Legal Issues in Inter-American Rela-
tions, 11 TEx. INT'L L. J. 63 (1976); Godoy, International Law and the New Political
Movement in Latin America, 54 AM. Soc'v INT'L L. PROC. 96 (1960); Jacobini, Interna-
tional Law in Latin America, 7 LAW. AM. 605 (1975); Lacarte, The Latin American Sys-
tem, 53 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROc. 62 (1959); and Valdez, Legal Development and Social
Change in Latin America and the Caribbean, 62 A.B.A.L.J. 485 (1976).
60. See Mercado, supra note 26; Sumida, The Right of Revolution: Implications For
International Law and Order, in POWER AND LAW 130-67 (Barker ed. 1971), reprinted in
M. McDOUGAL & W. REISMAN, supra note 57, at 167-69. See also M. DE VRIES & J. RODRI-
GUEz-NOVAS, supra note 45, at xi.
61. See C. FENWICK, supra note 59, at 4, 295; see also O.AS. CHARTER, infra note 64,
arts. 1, 5.
62. 18 U.S.C. § 960, 22 U.S.C. §§ 441, 461 (1982).
63. See generally U.N. CHARTER.
64. Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394,
T.I.A.S. No. 2361, 119 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter cited as O.A.S. CHARTER]. See also Amend-
ment to O.A.S. CHARTER, Feb. 27, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607, T.I.A.S. No. 6847. Relevant provi-
sions of the O.A.S. Charter follow:
Article 7
Every American State has the duty to respect the rights enjoyed by every other
State in accordance with international law.
Article 11
The right of each State to protect itself and to live its own life does not author-
ize it to commit unjust acts against another State.
Article 12
The jurisdiction of States within the limits of their national territory is exercised
equally over all the inhabitants, whether nationals or aliens.
Article 13
Each State has the right to develop its cultural, political and economic life freely
and naturally. In this free development, the State shall respect the rights of the
individual and the principles of universal morality.
Id.
65. Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Sept. 2, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1838,
21 U.N.T.S. 77 [hereinafter cited as Rio Treaty]. Relevant provisions of the Rio Treaty
follow:
Article 1
The High Contracting Parties formally condemn war and undertake in their
international relations not to resort to the threat or the use of force in any man-
ner inconsistent with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations or of
this Treaty.
Article 2
As a consequence of the principle set forth in the preceding Article, the High
Contracting Parties undertake to submit every controversy which may arise be-
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Pact of Bogota,6 6 are relevant to the dispute.
The doctrine of nonintervention and related theories of interven-
tion often come into conflict. Nonintervention was recognized in the
1830's under the Monroe Doctrine as prohibiting European interfer-
ence in the Americas.6 7 The Latin American nations have redefined the
principle in Inter-American affairs: no American state shall intervene
in the internal affairs of a fellow American state.'s This principle has
become clearly enshrined in numerous treaties and agreements both in
tween them to methods of peaceful settlement and to endeavor to settle any
such controversy among themselves by means of the procedures in force in the
Inter-American System before referring it to the General Assembly or the Secur-
ity Council of the United Nations.
Article 3
1. The High Contracting Parties agree that an armed attack by any State
against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the Amer-
ican States and, consequently, each one of the said Contracting Parties under-
takes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of indi-
vidual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the
United Nations.
2. On the request of the State or States directly attacked and until the decision
of the Organ of Consultation of the Inter-American System, each one of the
Contracting Parties may determine the immediate measures which it may indi-
vidually take in fulfillment of the obligation contained in the preceding para-
graph and in accordance with the principle of continental solidarity. The Organ
of Consultation shall meet without delay for the purpose of examining those
measures and agreeing upon the measures of a collective character that should
be taken.
Article 6
If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political
independence of any American State should be affected by an aggression which
is not an armed aftack or by an extra-continental or intra-continental conflict, or
by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America, the
Organ of Consultation shall meet immediately in order to agree on the measures
which must be taken in case of aggression to assist the victim of the aggression
or, in any case, the measures which should be taken for the common defense and
for the maintenance of the peace and security of the Continent.
Id.
66. See generally American Treaty on Pacific Settlement, reprinted in THE INTER-
AMERICAN SYSTEM, infra note 97, at 387 [hereinafter cited as Pact of Bogota]. The Pact
of Bogota is cited here as evidence of customary Inter-American law. The United States
never ratified the Pact of Bogota; the United States was not satisfied with its rules re-
garding diplomatic protection, including the rule of exhaustion of local remedies by
aliens. See M. DE VsIEs & J. RODRI, uEz-NovAs, supra note 45, at 106.
67. See Note, supra note 34.
68. See O.A.S. CHARTER, supra note 64, art. 15. See also id. arts. 16-19:
Article 16
No State may use or encourage the use of coercive measures of an economic or
political character in order to force the sovereign will of another State and ob-
tain from it advantages of any kind.
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the Americas and in the world community. 9
Interpretations on the legitimacy of intervention, on the other
hand, abound.70 If nonintervention is the stated rule, exceptions al-
lowing intervention diminish it. The use of force for collective security
measures, 71 self-defense72  and humanitarian intervention7 ' have in
some cases been deemed legitimate, if exercised within the framework
of necessity and proportionality.7 4 Covert aid, however, provided for
Article 17
The territory of a State is inviolable; it may not be the object, even temporarily,
of military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another State, di-
rectly or indirectly, on any grounds whatever. No territorial acquisitions or spe-
cial advantages obtained either by force or by other means of coercion shall be
recognized.
Article 18
The American States bind themselves in their international relations not to
have recourse to the use of force, except in the case of self-defense in accordance
with existing treaties or in fulfillment thereof.
Article 19
Measures adopted for the maintenance of peace and security in accordance with
existing treaties do not constitute a violation of the principles set forth in Arti-
cles 15 and 17.
Id.
69. Id. See also U.N. CHARTER art. 2(7); C.G. FENWICK, supra note 59, at 61.
70. See J. Moore, supra note 55, at 3, 38, 111, 129. Letter from Sidney Hook to the
Editor, N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 1984, at A22, col. 3. Mr. Hook refers to the moral principles
set forth by John Stuart Mill in 1859 in his essay on Non-Intervention:
To go to war for an idea, if the war is aggressive not defensive, is as criminal
as to go to war for territory or for revenue; for it is as little justifiable to force
our ideas on other people, as to compel them to submit to our will in any other
respect ....
The doctrine of non-intervention to be a legitimate principle of morality
must be accepted by all governments. The despots must consent to be bound by
it as the free states. Unless they do, the profession of it by free countries comes
but to this miserable issue, that the wrong side may help the wrong side, but the
right side may not help the right. Intervention to enforce non-intervention is
always right, always moral, if not always prudent.
Id. (quoting Mill on nonintervention).
71. Collective security measures are sanctioned by the U.N. and O.A.S. Charters. See
U.N. CHARTER art. 51; O.A.S. CHARTER, supra note 64, ch. v.
72. See U.N. CHARTER art. 51; O.A.S. CHARTER, supra note 64, art. 102.
73. Humanitarian intervention is a doctrine which justifies reasonable efforts by a
nation-state to protect its nationals caught in life threatening and illegal foreign civil
strife. Humanitarian intervention has gained gradual recognition in international law.
For a collection of viewpoints on the subject, see HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE
U.N. (R. Lillich ed. 1973). See also Brownlie, Thoughts on Kind-Hearted Gunmen, id. at
139; Hassan, Realpolitik in International Law: After Tanzanian-Ugandan Conflict
"Humanitarian Intervention" Reexamined, 17 WILLAMET[ E L. REv. 859 (1981).
74. Necessity and proportionality are traditional components in determining the le-
gitimacy of the use of force and self-defensive measures. These standards of customary
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the purpose of overthrowing a legitimate government, violates interna-
tional law.78
Furthermore, aggression, or acts of aggression, are condemned uni-
versally in scholarly writings and international agreements."6 For ex-
ample, direct military intervention, as in the case of the Soviet Union's
international law predate the U.N. Charter. On this topic, see Brownlie, The Use of
Force in Self Defense, 37 BRIr. Y.B. INT'L L. 183 (1961); M. McDoUGAL & F. FELICIANO,
LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 217-18 (1961):
The Requirements of Self-Defense: Necessity and Proportionality
These preliminary distinctions make it possible now to focus more sharply
upon the class of claims with which we are immediately concerned-claims to
use highly intense coercion in defense against what is claimed to be impermissi-
ble initiating coercion. The principal requirements which the "customary law" of
self-defense makes prerequisite to the lawful assertion of these claims are com-
monly summarized in terms of necessity and proportionality. For the protection
of the general community against extravagant claims, the standard of required
necessity has been habitually cast in language so abstractly restrictive as almost,
if read literally, to impose paralysis. Such is the clear import of the classical
peroration of Secretary of State Webster in the Caroline case-that there must
be shown a "necessity of self defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of
means and no moment for deliberation." The requirement of proportionality
which, as we shall develop below, is but another application of the principle of
economy in coercion, is frequently expressed in equally abstract terms. One ex-
ample is M. de Brouckbre's formulation: "Legitimate defense implies the adop-
tion of measures proportionate to the seriousness of the attack and justified by
the imminence of the danger." There is, however, increasing recognition that the
requirements of necessity and proportionality as ancillary prescriptions (in
slightly lower-order generalization) of the basic community policy prohibiting
change by violence, can ultimately be subjected only to that most comprehensive
and fundamental test of all law, reasonableness in particular context. What re-
mains to be stressed is that reasonableness in particular context does not mean
arbitrariness in decision but in fact its exact opposite, the disciplined ascription
of policy import to varying factors in appraising their operational and functional
significance for community goals in given instances of coercion.
Id.
75. Covert aid, if used for this purpose, violates articles 15-19 of the O.A.S. Charter
(see supra note 68), as well as customary international law. On the topic of covert inter-
vention, see Fatouros, Remarks on Covert Intervention and International Law, 69 AM.
Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 192 (1975); Falk, An Alternative to Covert Intervention, id. at 195.
The United States, however, has expressed the view that the realities of political
intercourse legitimate the use of covert aid as a foreign policy tool. See Smith, Shultz
and President Defend Aid for Rebels to Sandinistas, N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1983, at Al,
col. 3. For commentary on the covert aid policy, see Wicker, A Policy of Hypocricy, id.,
Oct. 21, 1983, at A35, col. 1; Reston, Reagan on Subversion, id., Oct. 23, 1983, at E19,
col. 1.
76. The prohibition against acts of aggression was enshrined in the United Nations
Charter, which states that "la]ll Members shall refrain . . . from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state." U.N. CHAR-
TER art. 2(4).
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invasion of Afghanistan, received nearly unanimous condemnation.7 7
Apart from a doctrinal discussion of intervention, nonintervention
and related legal concerns, customary Inter-American law must be
taken into account. The self-perception of the American states is that
they have developed their own historical system within the United Na-
tions framework. 78 The norm of nonintervention is propounded to an
extent not seen in other regional systems. The stated customary norms
treat American states as equals and impart to each a duty not to inter-
vene in the internal affairs of other American states.
7
1
The right of revolution and self-determination are further princi-
ples of international law applicable to the United States-Nicaragua
conflict. The processes of change within nation-states and between na-
tion-states are determined by a myriad of social, political, cultural, re-
ligious and economic conditions.8 " A right recognized under such a his-
torical analysis is the right to revolution.81 This right is not codified in
international law, but it is generally accepted as the right of a nation-
state's people to overthrow a repressive government when all peaceful
avenues of change are exhausted.8 2 This right to revolution can be
manipulated either way if viewed through the East-West prism: the
Marxist-Leninist right to revolution (i.e., violent, anti-capitalist, prole-
tarian rebellion) versus the democratic right to revolution, or the right
to democratic revolution (i.e., popular revolution followed by represen-
tative government).
8 3
An outgrowth of the right to revolution and recognition of the his-
77. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1983, at Bll, col. 6; id., Mar. 10, 1983, at A4, col. 1;
Letter to the Editor from David Apter, id., Oct. 23, 1983, at E18, col. 2 (entitled Central
America: U.S. on a Disaster Course).
78. See generally H. DE VRIES & J. RODRIGUEZ-NOVAS, supra note 45; see also O.A.S.
CHARTER, supra note 64, art. 1.
79. See O.A.S. CHARTER, supra note 64, art. 6.
80. See, e.g., Valdez, Developing the Role of Law in Social Change: Past Endeavors
and Future Opportunities in Latin America and the Caribbean, 7 LAW. Am. 1 (1975).
81. See Mercado, supra note 26; see also H. DE VRIES & J. RODRIGuEz-NovAs, supra
note 45, at xi.
82. See Fuentes, High Noon in Latin America, VANITY FAIR, Sept. 1983, at 45.
83. See Sumida, supra note 60. Marxists view revolution as the outgrowth of the
class struggle; such revolutions have been characterized as leading to totalitarian re-
gimes. See President Reagan's Address, supra note 11, at 3. Democratic revolution is
characterized as placing on the new government the duty to hold free elections and allow
for peaceful self-representation. Id.
President Reagan's characterization of the Contras as "freedom fighters" and the
"moral equal of the founding fathers" expresses his view that they are entitled to revolt
to press for democratic, representative government, as opposed to the present pseudo-
democratic, pseudo-Marxist government.
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torical processes of change is the right to self-determination.8 4 This
right is often viewed in the context of history progressing from accept-
ance of colonialism,88 but it also applies to minority groups in situa-
tions of internal strife caused by repressive regimes.80
One area of United States law with international implications is
the Neutrality Act of 1794." This Act bars the United States from ex-
erting force with the purpose of damaging or toppling foreign govern-
ments.8 8 In light of present United States policy in Nicaragua, suits
have been instigated against various Reagan administration officials for
supporting rebel groups seeking the overthrow of a foreign
government."8
84. The right of self-determination is generally recognized in international law. The
O.A.S. Charter states that "[elach State has the right to develop its cultural, political
and economic life freely and naturally." O.A.S. CHARTER, supra note 64, art. 13.
85. The General Assembly Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples, Dec. 14, 1960, 15 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) at 66, U.N. Doc. A/
4684 (1961), states that "all peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of
that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic,
social and cultural development."
86. For one account of the plight of Nicaragua's Miskito Indians, see Kennedy, supra
note 16.
87. 18 U.S.C. § 960; 22 U.S.C. §§ 441, 461 (1982). See also Taylor, War Powers: Back
in Court, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1984, at A9, col. 1. See also generally Lobel, The Rise and
Decline of the Neutrality Act: Sovereignty and Congressional War Powers in United
States Foreign Policy, 24 HARv. INT'L L.J. 1 (1983).
88. The law states:
Whoever, within the United States, knowingly begins or sets foot or provides or
prepares a means for or furnishes the money for, or takes part in, any military or
naval expedition or enterprise to be carried on from thence against the territory
or dominion of any foreign prince or state, or of any colony, district or people
with whom the United States is at peace, shall be fined not more than $3,000 or
imprisoned not more than three years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 960 (1982).
Another applicable provision in the context of neutrality is found in the Logan Act,
18 U.S.C. § 956 (1982) (relating to conspiracies to injure property of foreign govern-
ments), which states:
(a) If two or more persons within the jurisdiction of the United States conspire
to injure or destroy specific property situated within a foreign country and be-
longing to a foreign government or to any political subdivision thereof with
which the United States is at peace, or any railroad, canal, bridge, or other pub-
lic utility so situated, and if one or more such persons commits an act within the
jurisdiction of the United States to effect the object of the conspiracy, each of
the parties to the conspiracy shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned
not more than three years, or both.
(b) Any indictment or information under this section shall describe the specific
property which it was the object of the conspiracy to injure or destroy.
89. See, e.g., Dellums v. Smith, 573 F. Supp. 1489 (N.D. Cal. 1983); 577 F. Supp. 1449
(N.D. Cal.); 577 F. Supp. 1456 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (Government's argument that the Neu-
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In addition to general principles of international law and specific
United States law, various international treaties and agreements apply
to the United States-Nicaragua conflict. The Charter of the United
Nations states in relevant part that the use of force for aggressive pur-
poses is prohibited in international affairs.9 0 Although other provisions
in the Charter permit collective security measures and self-defense, 1
whether the Charter can reasonably be interpreted to allow internal
interference by one United Nations signatory against another remains
in controversy.
9 2
The Charter of the Organization of American States (O.A.S.) is the
regional treaty enacted by the member states of the Western Hemi-
sphere to work within the United Nations framework to promote col-
lective regional action, problem solving and development. 3 The O.A.S.
Charter states that "[c]ontroversies of an international character aris-
ing between two or more American States shall be settled by peaceful
procedures,"94 and condemns wars and acts of aggression." With re-
spect to intervention, the O.A.S. Charter states:
trality Act does not apply to Government officials, but only to private citizens, rejected;
appeal pending); Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596 (D.D.C. 1983) (suit dis-
missed on political question grounds; appeal pending). The chance of these suits result-
ing in criminal charges against Administration officials is doubtful, however, because of
past Congressional support for covert aid.
The Neutrality Act suits raise the issue whether Congress or the President has the
power to engage in warring activities, as well as whether covert aid can be deemed an act
of war. See Taylor, supra note 87; Neutrality and Private Adventures, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 12, 1984, at B10, col. 4; Allowing Civilian Aid to Latin War Efforts: Is it Legal?,
id., Sept. 10, 1984, at A10, col. 3; Moves to Evade Congress on Aid for Latins Seen, id.,
May 18, 1984, at Al, col. 2 ("The Reagan Administration is using a variety of methods to
finance military and intelligence activities in Central America that bypass normal Con-
gressional consideration and exceed spending limits set by Congress, according to Ad-
ministration officials, members of Congress and classified documents").
90. U.N. CHARTER arts. 2(3)-(4).
91. Id. arts. 51-52.
92. The controversy centers around the difficulty of defining self-defense and collec-
tive security, and specifically whether anticipatory measures can be deemed defensive.
Jeane Kirkpatrick, President Reagan's first appointee as the United States Permanent
Representative to the United Nations and an ardent supporter of present United States
policy, has addressed these policy issues in various speeches. See J. KIRKPATRICK, THE
REAGAN PHENOMENON 183-212 (1981). For opposing views, see generally J. Moore, supra
note 55.
93. O.A.S. CHARTER, supra note 64, chs. IV-VIII. For a discussion of the O.A.S., see
Note, A Microcosmic View of the O.A.S.: The Honduras-El Salvador Conflict, 57 VA. L.
REV. 291 (1971); Orfila, At the Turning Point: Freedom and Justice in the Transforma-
tion of the Inter-American System, in THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, infra note 97, at
293.
94. O.A.S. CHARTER, supra note 64, art. 5(g). With reference to pacific settlement of
disputes, see articles 20-22:
95. Footnote 95 appears at p. 154.
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No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly
or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or exter-
nal affairs of any other State. The foregoing principle prohibits
not only armed force but also any other form of interference or
attempted threat against the personality of the State or against
its political, economic and cultural elements."
Other treaties and agreements which apply to the United States-
Nicaragua conflict are the Declaration of Santiago, Chile on Represen-
tative Democracy,97 the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assis-
tance (the Rio Treaty)" and the American Treaty on Pacific
Settlement."
A final statement of international law with application to United
States intervention in Nicaragua can be found in the 1949 decision of
the International Court of Justice, in the Corfu Channel case, regard-
ing the use of force:
Article 20
All international disputes that may arise between American States shall be sub-
mitted to the peaceful procedures set forth in this Charter, before being referred
to the Security Council of the United Nations.
Article 21
The following are peaceful procedures: direct negotiation, good offices, media-
tion, investigation and conciliation, judicial settlement, arbitration, and those
which the parties to the dispute may especially agree upon at any time.
Article 22
In the event that a dispute arises between two or more American States which,
in the opinion of one of them, cannot be settled through the usual diplomatic
channels, the Parties shall agree on some other peaceful procedure that will en-
able them to reach a solution.
Id. arts. 20-22.
95. Id. arts. 5(f), 15-19.
96. Id. art. 15.
97. See INTER-AM. INST. OF INT'L LEGAL STUD., THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM 370-71
(1966). The Declaration of Santiago, Chile on Representative Democracy was announced
at the Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in 1959 (consultation
meetings are held pursuant to chapter XI of the O.A.S. Charter). The Declaration states
that the governments of the American republics should be the result of free elections;
that freedom of the press, radio, and television, and, in general, freedom of information
and expression, are essential conditions for the existence of a democratic regime; and
that the American states shall cooperate to strengthen democratic institutions within the
framework of law to develop economic structures and achieve just and humane living
conditions for their peoples. Id.
98. See Rio Treaty, supra note 65. Article 1 condemns war and threats or use of
force. Id. art. 1. Article 9 characterizes aggression as unprovoked armed attack by a state
against the territory, the people or the land, sea or air forces of a state; and invasion by
the armed forces of a state across recognized boundaries. Id. art. 9.
99. See Pact of Bogota, supra note 66. The Pact of Bogota imposes a general obliga-
tion on American states to settle disputes by pacific means. Id. ch. 1.
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The Court can only regard the alleged right to intervention as
the manifestation of a policy of force, such as has, in the past,
given rise to most serious abuses and such as cannot, whatever
be the present defects in international organization, find a
place in international law. Intervention is perhaps still less ad-
missible in the particular form it would take here; for, from the
nature of things, it would be reserved for the most powerful
states, and might easily lead to perverting the administration
of international justice itself.00
LEGITIMACY OF CLAIMS AND ACTIONS
The application of the foregoing principles to the United States
intervention in Nicaragua and to Nicaragua's actions with regard to its
neighbors is a difficult task. Furthermore, the analysis may suffer due
to the ideological predisposition of the examiner. The issues of inter-
vention and counterintervention, however, must be examined in a prin-
cipled manner. From a technical standpoint, both United States and
Nicaraguan actions ignore treaty imperatives with regard to noninter-
vention and the settlement of disputes.0 1 The prohibition against the
use of force, except in clearly defined situations, is unequivocal.102 Yet
the analysis cannot end with a simple reverence for textual
commandments.
Assuming that the United Nations and the O.A.S. Charters allow
for collective actions in furtherance of their overall principles, United
States intervention (e.g., efforts to halt the flow of arms) could be justi-
fied if it were shown that neighboring countries were in imminent dan-
ger of being overthrown due to Nicaraguan support. s03 First, it would
have to be established that Nicaragua was supplying arms and provid-
ing a haven for guerrillas for the purpose of overthrowing the Salvado-
ran Government. The threat would have to be genuine by objective
standards, not merely perceived. In addition, the threat to the Govern-
ment of El Salvador would have to be primarily international rather
than internal." 4 If Nicaragua's aid in the form of arms was small or
100. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 35 (Merits Judgment of Apr. 9).
101. Rio Treaty, supra note 65, arts. 1, 9; Pact of Bogota, supra note 66, ch. 1.
102. See supra note 101.
103. The threat to the Governments of El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala posed
by Nicaraguan aid to rebels is disputed. Jeane Kirkpatrick argues that Nicaraguan aid is
extensive. J. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 92, at 186-87. For an opposing view, see Kinzer,
supra note 4, at 73 (stating that there is no public evidence that the Sandinistas are
sending large amounts of weapons to the Salvadoran guerrillas). See also supra note 37.
104. This issue is one of the most intensely debated in the Central American crisis.
President Reagan asserts that outside influences are a primary cause of the unrest in El
19841
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.
insubstantial, and El Salvador's conflict was primarily an internal po-
litical upheaval, a United States response claiming Nicaraguan inter-
vention in El Salvador would ring hollow.
The notion that intervention is justified in furtherance of collec-
tive security and to halt communist expansion in Central America de-
pends upon the nature of the threat and the nature of the response. 0 5
Whether the threat is internal or external is a threshold consideration.
The United States asserts that it is providing' support to El Salvador,
Guatemala and Honduras to help these countries defend themselves
against communist guerrilla movements aided by Nicaragua, in other
words an external threat."0 To the extent that arms and aid are being
provided for defensive measures against this external threat, they are
appropriate. Under this approach, however, aid which goes beyond de-
fensive aid is inappropriate.
To assess the legitimacy of the United States response the criteria
of necessity and proportionality must be employed.'0 7 The necessity
and proportionality of United States intervention in Nicaragua and
Central America is difficult to gauge without accurate figures in terms
of the arms, military advisors and general support Nicaragua is provid-
ing to rebel insurgencies.'" State Department figures indicate that the
Salvador. See President Reagan's Address, supra note 11, at 5. This basic approach to
Central America has received constant criticism. Carlos Fuentes, a Mexican novelist, ar-
gues that the cause of civil strife is primarily internal. See Fuentes, Force Won't Work in
Nicaragua, N.Y. Times, July 24, 1983, at E21, col. 1.
105. One commentator, Viron P. Vaky, former United States Ambassador to Costa
Rica, Columbia and Venezuela, and former Asst. Sec. of State for Inter-American Aff.
(1978-79), has written:
[t]his uncertainty about the nature of the threat gives rise to a host of other
questions, also unresolved .... What about ... a 'political solution'?... What
does one mean by 'negotiation'? And what really are our demands?...Why
can't the White House separate the two--separate an immediate security threat
from a long-term political objective?...Doesn't the Administration see that it
would be more practical to negotiate now about concrete security problems, such
as an end to cross-border subversion, and leave aside larger "internal" problems,
such as the evolution of democracy, until they can be pursued by more appropri-
ate strategies? Washington's argument has been that you cannot trust the
Sandinistas to behave unless they "change their spots." It has therefore been
reluctant even to enter negotiations. For the Administration, it is a matter of all
or nothing.
Vaky, What Do We Want in Nicaragua, N.Y. Times, June 18, 1984, at A19, col. 2.
106. See President Reagan's Address, supra note 11.
107. See supra note 74.
108. See Kinzer, supra note 4, at 73. Supporters of the Reagan administration's pol-
icy cite to the shipment of arms in Nicaraguan boats across the Gulf of Fonseca, as well
as the passage of Soviet and Cuban weapons through the mountains to Salvadoran and
Guatemalan rebels, as evidence of Nicaragua's role as a weapons supplier to insurgents in
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threat is precipitous; other figures indicate that Nicaraguan aid to Sal-
vadoran rebels is minor.109 According to these sources, the situation in
El Salvador is not one of Nicaragua's or the Soviet's making.
1 0
Military aid and intervention can be considered necessary and
proportional if undertaken for defensive purposes and at the request of
legitimate governments, although not if undertaken for aggressive pur-
poses."1 Given the numerous reports of United States covert aid and
support of the Contras, whose known goal is the overthrow of the
Sandinista regime and who regularly carry out aggressive and destabi-
lizing military actions, 1 2 it can hardly be argued that such aid is for
defensive or non-aggressive purposes. 8 If United States covert aid can
be shown to have the purpose of overthrowing a sovereign state govern-
ment, and the Nicaraguan regime can be shown to be a legitimate gov-
ernment, then United States aid is clearly adverse to international
law.
114
Related to the issues of the necessity and proportionality of the
United States actions, the degree of externality of the threat to El Sal-
vador, and the legitimacy of covert aid in regard to Nicaragua, is the
principle of self-determination. ' 5 The sovereignty of the Sandinista re-
gime, whether or not it fulfills the requirements of a democracy, is un-
questioned. It is a duly recognized government,1 16 governing with the
apparent support of the people.' The Nicaraguans claim the inherent
right to develop their internal system free from outside interference.1 8
Central America. See J. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 92, at 186-90.
109. See President Reagan's Address, supra note 11, at 5. See also Kinzer, supra
note 4, at 73; supra note 37.
110. See Fuentes, supra notes 82, 104.
111. See O.A.S. CHARTER, supra note 64, chs. IV-VIII. The difficulty of assessing
whether the coercive use of force is aggressive or defensive underlies the entire debate on
Central America. The O.A.S. Charter proscribes aggressive intervention aimed at legiti-
mate governments. Id.
112. See supra notes 40, 41, 44. See also A Rebel Says C.I.A. Pledged Help in War
Against Sandinistas, N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1984, at Al, col. 1 (Edgar Chamorro, a former
director of the Nicaraguan Democratic Force, disclosed the C.I.A.'s plan to use him in
efforts to get additional funding approved by Congress).
113. See Kinzer, Nicaraguan Rebels Predict Success With U.S. Aid, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 16, 1984, at A10, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Rebels]. See also Gerth, supra note 40.
114. See Rebels, supra note 113. See also Kinzer, supra note 4, at 73.
115. See O.A.S. CHARTER, supra note 64, art. 16. The principle of self-determination
has been invoked on behalf of the Contras as well as the Sandinistas. See Pastora, supra
note 4. Various components of the Nicaraguan population are dissatisfied with the
Sandinista regime, including the Contras of the north and south as well as the Miskito
Indians, many of whom have been displaced by Sandinista programs. See supra note 16.
116. See President Reagan's Address, supra note 11, at 3.
117. See Pastora, supra note 4; Kinzer, supra note 4.
118. See Mercado, supra note 26.
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This right is transgressed when foreign governments seek to undermine
a popularly supported regime. The right of Nicaragua to supply arms
and export subversion is not condoned in international law, but neither
is the right of the United States to intervene, even by proxy (e.g., the
Contras), with the purpose of affecting adversely the sovereignty of an
independent state.11 9
POLITICAL REALITIES
Many commentators and concerned world citizens question the ef-
ficacy of international law when effective enforcement appears to be an
unascertainable goal. 20 The Nicaraguan situation is such that the po-
litical realities of effective power guide the situation more than the
norms of international law. The history of internal strife, the dense fog
of East-West relations and the political necessities of strategic plan-
ning often eclipse the pristine realm of legal theories.
The history of fighting in Central America and Nicaragua, the
specter of United States intervention1 2' and the lingering remembrance
of the Somoza era infect the region with warm blood. The Somoza re-
gime came to power in 1933 with the support of the United States,
after several years of fighting in which United States Marines battled
Nicaraguan rebels. 22 The Somozas ruled for almost fifty years, and
near the end of the last Somoza regime even the O.A.S. was calling for
the ouster of General Anastasio Somoza Debayle due to his oppressive
rule.
123
In addition to its scarred history, the contemporary situation in
Central America and Nicaragua is marked by the shadow of the super-
powers. The United States views the Marxist-Leninist Sandinista re-
gime as another communist foothold in the hemisphere, while the Sovi-
119. The element of proportionality is raised with respect to the extent of United
States involvement in Central America. Providing aid for defensive measures to the re-
gion's regimes is a proportional response to Nicaraguan aggression. Proportionality, how-
ever, is abused when specific tactics are employed to destabilize a government. See
Gerth, supra note 40.
120. See Nimetz, Respect World Law, N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1984, at A19, col. 2. See
also Apter, supra note 77. Mr. Apter is a Professor of Comparative Political and Social
Development at Yale. He argues that direct intervention and destabilizing coercion de-
stroy the balance and perspective necessary for properly functioning internal systems.
Id. See also Taylor, Squaring International Law With Political Imperatives, N.Y.
Times, Oct 30, 1983, at E2, col. 2. For a discussion on the relationship between interna-
tional law and foreign policymaking, see Boyle, International Law as a Basis for Con-
ducting American Foreign Policy: 1972-1982, 8 YALE J. WORLD. PUB. ORDER 103 (1981).
121. See Kinzer, supra note 4, at 22.
122. Id. at 24.
123. See N.Y. Times, June 24, 1979, at Al, col. 6.
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ets view the United States actions as an exercise in gunboat policy to
quash dialectic change. 24 Unfortunately for the Nicaraguan people, the
East-West cloud will not go away.
In fitting the political realities into an international law frame-
work, four types of strategies are exposed: diplomatic, ideological, eco-
nomic and military.'25 It is customary for countries to pursue all four
channels in their external policies, yet United States policies toward
Nicaragua illustrate that diplomatic and ideological approaches are
often deemed of limited efficacy.' In the economic realm, United
States measures have been slanted against the Nicaraguans ever since
the period following the revolution. Reconstruction aid was provided
until 1981, but as the Reagan administration became displeased with
the direction the Sandinistas were taking, economic cooperation was
reduced. 12 7 Sugar imports were cut. 26 The principle of cooperation to
124. The Soviets view the United States role in Nicaragua as they viewed our role in
Grenada; the Grenada invasion was called banditry and terrorism. See id., Oct. 26, 1983,
at A17, col. 1.
125. See M. McDouGAL & W. REimsAN, supra note 57, at 963.
126. See Gerth, supra note 40.
127. See President Reagan's Address, supra note 11, at 3. The Administration main-
tains that despite its initial large scale aid the Sandinistas spurned United States assis-
tance. Id. See As Economic Woes Mount, Managua Foresees Shortages, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 22, 1984, at Al, col. 5, for a detailed account of Nicaragua's economy and United
States aid over the last ten years. One news report states that the economic relationship
between the United States and Nicaragua is inconsistent, if not paradoxical:
Certainly the current relations between Washington and Managua show an un-
usual mix of truculence and diplomacy. In the last three years, as the Central
Intelligence Agency has given money, arms, airplanes and advice to Nicaraguan
rebels, in effect sponsoring a war against the Sandinistas, United States citizens
and officials have traveled freely to Nicaragua. The State Department has de-
nied visas to several Sandinista leaders, but permitted thousands of other Ni-
caraguans to travel in this country.
The Administration last year banned the import of most of Nicaragua's
sugar crop, a severe economic blow, and has opposed loans to Managua by the
World Bank and International Monetary Fund. But it has done nothing to keep
out Nicaraguan bananas. While the Voice of America announced last week that
it would begin increasing broadcasts into Nicaragua, Nicaragua's national air-
line, Aeronica, was still flying into Miami and dozens of American corporations
continued to do business in Nicaragua.
Nicaragua Is Getting a Mix of Signals, id., Sept. 9, 1984, at E4, col. 3. See also id., Mar.
19, 1985, at A10, col. 4:
Although trade between the two countries has declined from the record high
registered in 1981, the United States remains Nicaragua's leading trade partner,
supplying about 20 percent of its imports and taking 19 percent of its exports,
according to United States Embassy estimates. Virtually the entire Nicaraguan
banana crop is sold in the United States and large amounts of Nicaraguan cof-
fee, cotton, meat and shellfish also go to the American market.
128. Footnote 128 appears at p. 160.
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strengthen the Inter-American economy was ignored. 2 9 Given the na-
ture of the Inter-American situation, where United States aid, or lack
thereof, has such a profound effect, economic coercion is a potent
method for influencing states.1
3 0
The United States policy has been described in one report as "2-
Track," a diplomatic and military effort to harass the Sandinistas and
to stop support of Salvadoran guerrillas.' 3 ' Furthermore, the United
States asserts that neighboring governments should not have to fear
the Nicaraguan Government. 2 Apparently, Costa Rica and Honduras
are suspicious of the Sandinistas.13 3 If this element continues to emerge
in United States policy, perpetual discord will undoubtedly be per-
ceived in the region.
Further examples of United States military and economic strategy
against Nicaragua, which clearly supercede diplomatic and ideological
bounds, are the attack on a Nicaraguan oil depot by Contras under
Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.) control and utilizing C.I.A. weap-
ons, 3 4 and the mining of Nicaraguan harbors.'35 As a result of the oil
refinery attack, Nicaragua's oil supply was cut drastically, causing se-
vere shortages and rationing.1 6 The result of the mining incident, be-
yond inhibiting Nicaragua's maritime trade for a limited period, was
increased international tension and condemnation of United States
support for the Contras. 13 7 These actions went beyond the stated ob-
jective of slowing the export of arms. Viewed in terms of proportional-
ity, the oil refinery attack was an overt act with disruptive civil conse-
128. See Sugar Imports From Central America, DEP'T ST. BULL., Aug. 1983, at 85.
129. See O.A.S. CHARTER, supra note 64, arts. 4(a) & (e), 5(i). For related discussion,
see supra note 127 and infra note 130.
The most recent example of the failure of the two countries to cooperate economi-
cally is the current United States trade embargo undertaken in May 1985. For several
news articles on the embargo and United States-Nicaraguan trade, as well as the text of
President Reagan's Executive Order initiating the embargo and his message to Congress,
see N.Y. Times, May 2, 1985, at Al, col. 4 & Al, col. 1.
130. The realities of Nicaragua's troubled economy also suggest that it is susceptible
to economic pressure. See Rohter, Nicaragua Says Its Fiscal Shape is "Hellish," N.Y.
Times, Feb. 10, 1985, at A9, col. 1 (citing inflation, the lack of economic growth and
devaluation of the cordoba). See generally Lillich, Economic Coercion and the Interna-
tional Legal Order, 51 INT'L AFF. 358 (1975).
131. See Meislin, Sandinistas Under Siege, N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1983, at Al, col. 3.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See Gerth, supra note 40; Oct. 10 Assault on Nicaraguans is Laid to C.I.A.,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 18, 1984, at Al, col. 2.
135. See supra note 41.
136. See Nicaragua Tries to Cut Fuel Use, N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1983, at A4, col. 3.
137. See supra note 41.
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quences, clearly exceeding the realm of reasonable defensive action.
The mining incident was an indiscriminate offensive action harming
the interests, not only of Nicaragua, but also of several countries, some
of whom are friends of the United States.
LEGAL RESPONSE
The two legal fora where the United States-Nicaragua dispute has
been litigated are the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.)' and
United States courts. 3 9 Nicaragua's action against the United States at
the I.C.J. involved first an application for a temporary injunction re-
straining further paramilitary activities against Nicaragua, 4 ' and sec-
ond a complaint for damages and a permanent order terminating such
military actions."" At the outset of the case jurisdictional issues were
litigated extensively, resulting in a decision favorable to Nicaragua.14
Subsequently, the United States withdrew from the case, declaring
that the I.C.J. should not be used as a propoganda forum for the deter-
mination of essentially political questions. 43 The United States further
138. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nic. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392 (Judgment of Nov. 26) [hereinafter cited as Nicaragua v.
U.S.]. For a detailed discussion of the case, see Molloy, 6 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
55 (1984).
The Nicaragua case has generated a plethora of response. See, e.g., Scorning the
World Court, N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1985, § 4 (Week in Review), at E22, col. 1 (Editorial);
Don't Duck Our Day in Court, id., Nov. 28, 1984, at A26, col. 1 (Editorial); Letter from
Allan Gerson to the Editor, id., June 6, 1984, at A26, col. 5 (the writer was special assis-
tant and counsel to Ambassador Kirkpatrick; he argued that the issue was inappropriate
for the I.C.J.); Am. Soc. Int'l Law Release, Apr. 12, 1984, Wash., D.C. (the Society "de-
plores the recent action of the United States Government in attempting to withdraw
from the jurisdiction of the [I.C.J.] 'disputes with any Central American state' ").
139. See supra note 89.
140. Nicaragua v. U.S., supra note 138, at 395.
141. Id. at 170-71 (Order of May 10).
142. Id. at 392 (Judgment of Nov. 26).
143. U.S. Withdrawal From the Proceedings Initiated by Nicaragua in the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1985, at A4, col. 1 (stating that Nicaragua
was misusing the Court, that the dispute was political rather than legal and that the
evidence clearly supported the United States position):
The United States has decided not to participate in further proceedings in this
case ....
[W]e have acted in the exercise of the inherent right of collective self-de-
fense, enshrined in the United Nations Charter and the Rio Treaty. We have
done so in the vital national security interests of the United States and in sup-
port of the peace and security of the hemisphere ....
The conflict in Central America, therefore, is not a narrow legal dispute; it is
an inherently political problem that is not appropriate for judicial resolution
.... The [I.C.J.] was never intended to resolve issues of collective security and
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stated that the United Nations Security Council and the O.A.S. are the
proper fora to consider the dispute with Nicaragua.'"
The other judicial bodies to grapple with the Nicaragua dispute
are United States courts. Litigation pursuant to the Neutrality Act has
been instigated against several Government officials. 1' The outcome of
these suits may not benefit Nicaragua or restrain United States offi-
cials, however, because the Act has traditionally been construed not to
limit governmental covert aid to foreigners, i.e., the power of the Presi-
dent and the Federal Government to exercise the foreign affairs powers
granted to them under the Constitution.4 6
In sum, legal adjudication of the Nicaraguan dispute has been in-
substantial. Given the United States withdrawal from the I.C.J. in that
case and the United States courts' reluctance to construe the Neutral-
ity Act broadly, it is doubtful whether any further legal decision will
effectively address the dispute.
POLITIcAL RESPONSE
The response of the United States populace to current Central
American policy is mixed. 4 " Many citizens support efforts to stem the
self-defense and is patently unsuited for such a role ....
The decision of Nov. 26 [the jurisdictional decision] represents an over-
reaching of the Court's limits, a departure from its tradition of judicial restraint
and a risky venture into treacherous political waters ....
We are therefore taking steps to clarify our acceptance of the Court's com-
pulsory jurisdiction in order to make explicit what we have understood from the
beginning, namely that cases of this nature are not proper for adjudication by
the Court.
Id.
One commentator, Prof. A. D'Amato, stated that the 1958 Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation, Jan. 21, 1956, 9 U.S.T. 449, T.LA.S. No. 4024, 367 U.N.T.S.
3, was relevant to the jurisdictional issue before the I.C.J. He stated that treaty provi-
sions guaranteeing freedom of commerce and navigation might be implicated, and that
the United States should have at least remained in the lawsuit to argue the interpreta-
tion and applicability of the 1958 treaty. Letter from A. D'Amato to the Editor, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 4, 1985, at A18, col. 3.
144. See supra note 143. Despite the United States withdrawal, the I.C.J. will hear
Nicaragua's case. N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1985, at A9, col. 1.
145. See supra note 89.
146. U.S. CONsT. art. II.
147. According to one source, the United States public does not favor intervention in
Nicaragua. See Chaliand, Central America's Unhappy Prospects, WORLD PRESS RE v.,
Jan. 1983, at 29-30. This attitude is evidenced by the popular slogan "Stop U.S. Inter-
vention in Central America." In contrast, the State Department maintains that the
United States will cease its defensive actions on behalf of other Central American re-
gimes only when Nicaragua stops aiding neighboring insurgencies. This conservative view
deems Nicaragua's role in Central America interventionist because Nicaragua supports
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growth of Marxism in the hemisphere, and believe that Nicaragua de-
Salvadoran and Honduran rebels. See generally COMMUNISM IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND
THE CARIBBEAN (R. Wesson ed. 1982).
News reports and commentary on the Nicaraguan conflict span the political spec-
trum, and focus on political, economic, social and religious issues more often than on
legal issues. For a sampling, see generally Purcell, The Value of Pressing Nicaragua,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1985, at A31, col. 2 (United States pressure does force the
Sandinistas to make concessions and may bring about a settlement under the Contadora
peace process); Lewis, When Reason Flees, id., Mar. 10, 1985, § 4 (Week in Review), at
E23, col. 1 ("ideological fixation drives Reagan's policy on Nicaragua"); Nicaragua Soap
and Froth, id., Mar. 3, 1985, § 4, at E20, col. 1 (Editorial); Muravchik, Topple the
Sandinistas, id., at E21, col. 1 (communist regimes must be undermined); Reagan Terms
Nicaraguan Rebels 'Moral Equal' of Founding Fathers, id., Mar. 2, 1985, at 1, col. 1;
Kornbluh, The Anti-Nicaragua Drive, id., Mar. 1, 1985, at A27, col. 1 (citing poll show-
ing 70% of United States citizens opposed to present policy regarding Nicaragua); Kel-
ler, U.S. General Says Nicaragua Rebels Cannot Win Soon, id., Feb. 28, 1985, at Al, col.
4 (Gen. Paul F. Gorman, former commander of United States military forces in Central
America, said that in the "foreseeable future" the Nicaraguan rebels will be incapable of
overthrowing the Sandinista Government); Rohter, Nicaraguan Says it Will Suspend
Arms Buildup, id., col. 5 (Pres. Ortega announced that an indefinite moratorium on the
acquisition of new arms systems was planned, and that 100 Cuban military advisers
would be sent home); Steel, Reagan Policy Moscow-Style, id., Feb. 26, 1985, at A27, col.
1 (calling Reagan's policy one of "manifest destiny" resembling "Brezhnev's doctrine");
Reagan Hurls the Harshest Broadside Yet at Nicaragua, id., Feb. 24, 1985, at A27, col.
1; Safire, Taking the War Private, id., Feb. 14, 1985, at A3, col. 1; A Middle Way in
Nicaragua, id., Feb. 13, 1985, at A26, col. 1 (Editorial); Bromwich, No Aid-Covert or
Overt, id., Feb. 10, 1985, at E21, col. 2; Valenta, Keep Pressing Managua, id.; Silber,
Plain Talk Behind Closed Doors in Central America, Wall St. J., Feb. 8, 1985, at 21, col.
3; Kenworthy, Seeing Central America Without Blinders, N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1985, at
A23, col. 2; Cruz, Managua's Central Problem, id., Dec. 6, 1984, at A31, col. 1; Taubman,
U.S. Seeks to Sway Opinion on Nicaraguan Policy, id., Nov. 14 , 1984, at A10, col. 3;
Massing, Accepting the Sandinistas, id., Oct. 2, 1984, at A31, col. 2; Bonner, Sandinistas
Aren't the Worst, id., Sept., 14, 1984, at A31, col. 1; Latin Policies Faulted in Ex-Of-
ficer's Report, id., Sept. 12, 1984, at A9, col. 1; Smith, Cuba-Time for a Thaw?, id., July
29, 1984, § 6 (Magazine), at 22, 56 (noting a pledge by Castro to remove all Cuban mili-
tary personnel provided the United States does the same; the pledge further calls for the
imposition of an arms embargo for the region); Purcell, To Win Liberals and Latins, id.,
June 21, 1984, at A23, col. 2; Democrats Press Nicaragua Issue, Wall St. J., May 31,
1984, at 60 (citing Gallup Poll showing 49% of United States populace opposed to Rea-
gan's Nicaraguan policy and 39% supportive of granting military aid); Crile, What Are
We Doing With The Contras, N.Y. Times, May 18, 1984, at A31, col. 2; Ayres, Study
Faults U.S. on Its Latin Policy, id., at A6, col. 3; Security Adviser to Reagan Backs
Covert Activities, id., May 14, 1984, at Al, col. 6 (Security Advisor Robert C. McFar-
lane); Gerson, U.S. Acts Lawfully, id., May 4, 1984, at A31, col. 1; Poll Finds a Lack of
Support for Latin Policy, id., Apr. 29, 1984, at Al, col. 3; Explosion over Nicaragua,
TIME, Apr. 23, 1984, at 16 ("Congress bitterly rebukes Reagan after reports of CIA-di-
rected minelaying"); Episcopal Bishop Calls U.S. Latin Policy 'Illegal and Immoral,'
N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 1984, at A9, col. 2; Getler, Nicaraguan Minelaying Said to Harm
U.S. Goals, Wash. Post, Apr. 13, 1984, at A20, col. 2; Linowitz, Support Contadora Di-
plomacy, N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 1984, at A23, col. 2.
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stabilizes Central America, justifying retaliatory measures. Criticism of
intervention is strong, however, both in public debate and in Con-
gress.' 4 8 In the past three years Congress has voted down continuing
appropriations for covert aid to the Contras, with some members stat-
ing that the money should go to Central American governments who
can legitimately use the money for the purpose of stopping the arms
flow to guerrillas, and not to the Contras.'" Public opinion, presuma-
bly a motivating force behind recent congressional action, is against
covert aid and intervention, and reflects dissatisfaction with President
Reagan's present policy. 5 0
The response of Nicaraguans to United States intervention is diffi-
cult to gauge, due in part to press censorship.' 5' The one opposition
148. See Central America's Unhappy Prospects, supra note 147, at 30. The Senate
voted for continued aid for covert operations in Nicaragua in November 1983. The
House, however, voted against continued support for Nicaraguan rebels. See Tolchin,
Secret U.S. Action Gets Senate Approval, N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1983, at Al, col. 6.
149. See House Decisively Defeats All Plans By Both Parties To Aid Rebels in Nica-
ragua, N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 1985, at Al, col. 4; Smith, House Again Votes Against Fi-
nancing Nicaragua Rebels, id., Oct. 21, 1983, at Al, col. 6. According to Rep. Michael D.
Barnes (D-Md): "Congress has voted four times in opposition to this program, and there
is no evidence that that will change . . . public opinion is very strong in opposition to
this program." President Denounces Sandinistas, Wash. Post, Feb. 17, 1985, at Al, col.
1.
With Congressional resistance to continued funding of the Contras, the Administra-
tion has considered other means for providing support. A recent article discussed the
possibility of using "friendly Asian countries to help channel aid to the Nicaraguan
rebels." Weinraub, U.S. is Considering Having Asians Aid Nicaragua Rebels, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 6, 1985, at Al, col. 1. See also Taubman, Nicaragua Rebels Reported to
Have New Flow of Arms, id., Jan. 13, 1985, § 1, at 1, col. 6 (citing Honduran, Salvadoran
and Israeli aid to the rebels, as well as Soviet aid to the Sandinistas).
150. A recent Washington Post-ABC News poll indicated that 70% of the American
population disapproves of efforts to overthrow the Nicaraguan Government, while only
twelve percent favor the idea. Lewis, supra note 147.
One result of public sentiment against funding the Contras was the 1983 Boland
amendment, which prohibited aid for military purposes. See Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal 1984, Pub. L. 98-215, § 108, 97 Stat. 1473 (1983).
151. See Russell, supra note 1, at 36-37; supra note 14. One Nicaraguan has written:
I took part in the Nicaraguan revolution, fighting against the dictator Anastasio
Somoza Debayle, and served in the Sandinista Government until May 1982,
when I resigned in dissent. I recently returned to Managua after two years of
self-imposed exile and met with a large number of leaders from the legitimate
opposition-people from independent labor unions, businessmen, farmers, intel-
lectuals, politicians and church leaders. Virtually all of them seek change in the
current regime, but through political, not military means--and through a Nica-
raguan process, not one driven by foreign interests.
Cesar, Nicaragua Must Seek Firm Independence, N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 1984, at A15, cot.
1. See also Sandinista Government Viewed as Leftist Hybrid, id., Mar. 23, 1985, at 3,
col. 1.
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newspaper is the target of continuing political pressure and efforts to
curb its opposing voice.152 In accounts by sources both supportive and
critical of the Sandinistas, however, Nicaraguan public support is be-
hind the Government.5 " The anti-yanqui sentiment which fermented
during the Somoza years and mobilized the revolution is still strong,
and is presently a source of support for the Sandinistas.
Although the Sandinistas rule with the general support of the
masses, many middle and upper class Nicaraguans are dissatisfied.',,
Apparently, people have fled the country, and those who remain recog-
nize the limitations on their capitalist freedoms. Despite the fact that
approximately sixty percent of property and business interests are still
privately owned, government rationing of basic resources (e.g., oil and
paper) and food items (e.g., eggs) is commonplace.15  Additionally, the
plight of many of Nicaragua's Indians has been disastrous.
One contention raised in the United States press is that support
for the revolution is strongest among the young, while the older and
wiser Nicaraguans realize that the Sandinistas have betrayed the origi-
nal premises of the revolution.5M According to this report, older Ni-
caraguans are for the present resigned to the Sandinistas. 57 This is
152. Id.
153. See Vaky, supra note 27, at 59-60; Kinzer, supra note 4, at 73; Mercado, supra
note 26; supra note 13.
154. See Russell, supra note 1, at 35, 40. See also Central America: The Second
Spanish Civil War, supra note 15, at 37-38.
According to Senator Kennedy, Indians have been grossly mistreated by the
Sandinistas, and form a large part of the resistance. See supra note 16. A contrary as-
sessment of the situation regarding Nicaraguan Indians follows:
Several thousand Miskitos were relocated in resettlement areas-not "detention
camps"-from war zones in 1982 and later as a matter of military necessity. But,
as an experienced America's [sic] Watch observer says, it is "blatantly false" to
suggest that such actions are intended "to wipe out an entire culture." Neither
their language, their religion nor their identity is being destroyed. Possibly 25
Miskitos-not "thousands"-were murdered, and some were mistreated and ar-
bitrarily arrested at the height of the tension. A handful are still in jail, following
an amnesty last year, when some 300 were released.
Oakes, Reagan's Version of Truth, N.Y. Times, July 9, 1984, at A19, col. 2. Mr. Oakes
states that President Reagan's charge that there "has been an attempt [by the Sandinis-
tas] to wipe out an entire culture, the Miskito Indians, thousands of whom have been
slaughtered or herded into concentration camps" is false. Id.
155. See Russell, supra note 1, at 34, 37. See also Central America: The Second
Spanish Civil War, supra note 15, at 37.
156. See Russell, supra note 1. This situation may have changed with the enactment
of the draft law in Nicaragua. Many families are resisting the draft, and youth are hiding
in various towns. Town Battles Military Draft in Nicaragua, N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1985,
at A9, col. 1.
157. See Russell, supra note 1.
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similar to the position held by the counterinsurgents in the south, for-
merly led by Commander Zero, who criticize the Sandinistas for be-
traying democratic principles in exchange for Marxist-Leninist totali-
tarian control.158
International response to the Nicaraguan situation varies.159 Many
158. See Pastora, supra note 4.
159. See, e.g., Nicaraguan Hailed in Brazil, N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1985, at All, col. 5.
One element of response to the United States-Nicaragua conflict pertains to human
rights. Americas Watch, a private human rights group, criticized in a recent report the
American-backed Nicaraguan rebels. "The report, made public today, adds that the larg-
est rebel organization, the Nicaraguan Democratic Force, has systematically executed its
prisoners, including wounded Sandinista soldiers." Brinkley, Rights Report on Nicara-
gua Cites Recent Rebel Atrocities, id., Mar. 6, 1985, at A10, col. 1. The report stated that
throughout 1984 and as recently as early 1985, "the anti-Government rebels have kid-
napped, tortured, raped, mutilated and murdered numerous unarmed civilians, including
women and children 'who were fleeing.'" Id.
The Americas Watch report also stated that the Nicaraguan Government has been
guilty of major human rights abuses, particularly with regard to Miskito Indians (deaths
and disappearances), but that since 1982 there has been a sharp decline in such abuses.
Id. See also Nicaragua, AMNESTY ACTION, Mar. 1983, at 8.
Other groups have conducted studies of the human rights situation in Nicaragua.
See Nicaragua Rebels Accused of Abuses, N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1985, at Al, col. 2; U.S.
Groups Conduct Interviews, id., at A12, col. 6. See also AMNESTY INT'L, THE HUMAN
RIGHTS SITUATION IN NICARAGUA (1983) (prepared statement presented to the House
Subcommittee on Human Rights and Int'l Organizations on Sept. 15, 1983).
The response of foreign governments also varies. One writer who was part of a Scan-
dinavian peace effort represents that several countries (e.g., Norway, Sweden, France,
Italy, Greece, Austria and Finland) support the present Nicaraguan Government. See
Letter from George Wald to the Editor, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1985, at A34, col. 3. See also
Brinkley, Costa Rica Angry With Nicaraguans, id., Feb. 28, 1985, at A13, col. 1; Dobbs,
Sandinista Leaders Seek Support from West European Countries, Wash. Post, Feb. 17,
1985, at A28, col. 1 ("both France and Spain have good financial and commercial rela-
tions with the Nicaraguan Government"); Spaniard Sees Nicaragua on Democratic
Path, N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1985, at A7, col. 1; Iran Premier Visits Nicaragua, id., Jan.
24, 1985, at A6, col. 2; Venezuelan Cautions Reagan on Use of Military Force, id., Dec.
5, 1984, at A3, col. 3; Russians Accuse U.S. of Seeking to Meddle in Nicaraguan Affairs,
id., Nov. 16, 1984, at A12. col. 4; Mexico Denies Shifting Its Latin Policy, id., Aug. 8,
1984, at A3, col. 3; Ferrer, Save Central America, id., June 11, 1984, at A19, col. 3 (Jos6
Figueres Ferrer, former Costa Rican President (1948-49, 1953-58, 1970-74)); Nicaragua
and Costa Rica Sign Border Pact, id., May 17, 1984, at A17, col. 1; Excerpts From Ad-
dress by Mexican to Congress, id., at A14, col. 1 ("'we therefore reject, without exception,
all military plans that would seriously endanger the security and development of the
region") (President de la Madrid); Blunt Talks Mark Reagan's Welcome for Mexico's
Chief, id., May 16, 1984, at Al, col. 6; Excerpts From Remarks by the Two Presidents,
id., at A4, col. I (following are remarks of Mexico's President Miguel de Ia Madrid:
In peacetime, we must also support the Central Americans in their social and
economic development programs and encourage their efforts to build democracy
and respect human rights. To that end, let us apply the principles and rules of
international law established by the countries of the American continent: self-
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in Europe are critical of United States actions, but there is also criti-
cism of the present Sandinista approach to governing. 60 The members
of the Contadora group oppose United States intervention and urge a
political settlement sponsored by less interested parties.6'' The O.A.S.
position on the fighting in Central America and United States policy
favors the proposals of the Contadora group.1
6 2
The response of religious institutions to Nicaragua and its dispute
with the United States is complex.6 3 For example, the Catholic
Church, while reiterating its primary concerns for human dignity,
peace and the sanctity of life, has recently ordered priests who hold
high level positions in the Sandinista Government to desist from min-
isterial functions.1 6 4 Archbishop Miguel Obando y Bravo of Managua
has been a constant critic of the Marxist direction of the present Gov-
ernment, and as a high ranking Catholic leader presumably speaks for
many Nicaraguans. 6 On the other hand, many Catholics, including
determination, non-intervention, equality of states before the law, peaceful solu-
tion of conflicts, and international cooperation for development);
Burstin, Reagan's Salvador Ally, id., May 15, 1984, at A29, col. I (Luis Burstin, Costa
Rican Sec. of Information from 1974-78); Ireland's Premier Chides President, id., June
4, 1984, at Al, col. 2; Fuentes, Don't Push Mexico, id., Apr. 24, 1984, at A27, col. 1; Costa
Rican Aides Said to Get Bribes, id., Apr. 23, 1984, at A9, col. 1; Mitterand Advises
Congress on Latin America, id., Mar. 23, 1984, at A6, col. 3.
160. See Kinzer, Disillusion With Nicaragua Grows in Europe, N.Y. Times, Nov. 16,
1983, at Al, col. 3.
161. The Contadora group consists of Mexico, Panama, Columbia and Venezuela.
The foreign ministers of each country met in 1983 to begin working on a negotiated
solution to Central America's conflicts. See Meislin, Mexican Cautions U.S. on Latin
Moves, id., Feb. 8, 1984, at A3, col. 3.
162. See Smith, Latin Nations Plan Nonaggression Pact, id., Nov. 16, 1983, at A3,
col. 4 [hereinafter cited as Latin Nations]. See also Smith, U.S. Defending Grenada
Actions Before O.A.S., id., Nov. 15, 1983, at Al, col. 5.
163. See Novak, The Case Against Liberation Theology, id., Oct. 21, 1984, at 41
(Magazine); Lowenstein, Nicaragua Fights Church's Growing Influence, Wall St. J., May
7, 1984, at 36 ("the Sandinistas and the church seem to regard themselves as rivals for
the moral leadership of Nicaragua"); Prelate Assails Sandinistas as Conflict Sharpens,
N.Y. Times, May 22, 1984, at A8, col. 2.
164. The Rev. Fernando Cardenal was dismissed by the Jesuit order in Rome for
disobeying an edict of Pope John Paul II barring priests from holding public office. Mott,
The Church Cuts off a Sandinista Priest, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1984, at E5, col. 1. The
other priests are Ernesto Cardenal, see infra note 167, the Foreign Minister Miguel
d'Escoto Brockman and Edgar Parrales, representative to the O.A.S. N.Y. Times, Dec.
11, 1984, at A3, col. 1.
165. See Kinzer, Nicaragua's Combative Bishop, N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1984, at 75
(Magazine); Rohter, Sandinista Meets 5 U.S. Prelates, id., Feb. 27, 1985, at A6, col. 1. In
a meeting with President Ortega American bishops discussed several issues, including
"restrictive residency regulations for foreign clerics working in Nicaragua and the resto-
ration of the church's right to broadcast masses and religious instruction on radio and
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nuns and priests, are deeply influenced by liberation theology, 66 which
focuses on the poor and preaches the gospel of liberation from oppres-
sion. Many adherents of liberation theology side with the Sandinista
Government as a condemnation of the oppression of the past.
1 6
7
A final barometer of political response within the United States to
the dispute is the recent report of the President's Commission on Cen-
tral America.6 8 The Kissinger Report calls for massive economic and
military aid to friendly Central American regimes, as well as human
rights improvements in El Salvador.169 The Report appears to favor
continued covert aid to the Contras, validating President Reagan's
anti-Sandinista policy.170 Furthermore, the Kissinger Report stresses
that Nicaraguan aid to Salvadoran and Honduran rebels must be
stopped. 1"
HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY ANALOGIES
Several historical and contemporary examples of prior United
States intervention in foreign conflicts are analogous to Nicaragua.
None of these examples are directly parallel, but comparison raises
similar legal and political issues. Taken chronologically, they are Viet-
nam, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Chile and Grenada.
television." Id. See also Leading Nicaraguan Bishop Says Sandinistas Impose 'Oppres-
sions,' id., Oct. 25, 1984, at Al, col. 1 (Bishop Pablo Antonio Vega, Pres. of Nicaragua's
Conference of Catholic Bishops).
166. See G. GUTItRREZ, THE THEOLOGY OF LIBERATION (1971). See also Novak, supra
note 163 ("liberation theology is a method of defining Christian faith in the political
context of underdevelopment, in a partisan spirit committed to action,. .. it [cannot] be
universally defined as Marxism. Yet it gains its excitement from flirting with Marxist
thought and speech, and from its hostility to the 'North' ").
For other works on the subject, see J. SEGUNDO, A THEOLOGY FOR ARTISANS OF A NEW
HUMANITY (1973); J. BONINO, CHRISTIANS AND MARXISTS: THE MUTUAL CHALLENGE TO
REVOLUTION (1976); H. ASSMANN, A THEOLOGY FOR A NOMAD CHURCH (1976); A. FIERRO,
THE MILITANT GOSPEL (1977); and L. BoFF, JESUS CHRIST LIBERATOR (1978).
167. See McKiernan, Shrines and Slogans: The Divided Church in Nicaragua,
MOTHER JONES, Apr. 1984, at 28, for a thorough discussion of the position of Nicaragua's
liberation theology adherents, as well as those who follow closely the official church
hierarchy.
Father Ernesto Cardenal, a poet and the Minister of Culture of the Sandinista Gov-
ernment, was also ordered to quit the Marxist-inspired Government by Pope John Paul
II. See Novak, supra note 163. Cardenal's poetry illuminates the fusion of religious and
social thought that characterizes many liberation theologists. See generally E. CARDENAL,
APOCALYPSE AND OTHER POEMS (1977).
168. See Report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America (Jan.
1984) [hereinafter cited as Kissinger Report].
169. Id. at 53, 103-04.
170. Id. at 101, 103.
171. Id. at 25-32.
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The United States goal in supporting the South Vietnamese was to
check North Vietnamese communist aggression, and to inhibit Chinese
and Soviet influence from spreading in eastern Asia.1 72 Many commen-
tators believe that United States goals in Vietnam were roughly similar
to those in Nicaragua, and that Vietnam is both a precedent and a
warning with respect to further action in Nicaragua. 17 Proximity is
one major difference between the two conflicts; another difference is
the overt versus covert nature of involvement, but the striking parallel
is United States support of non-communist forces against what is pre-
sumed to be international communism.
Many critics of United States policy toward Nicaragua warn of
"another Vietnam."'17 4 The Reagan administration, sensitive to this
criticism, denies any intention to invade Nicaragua. 17 5 The Vietnam
episode, however, illustrates that involvement which at first is consid-
ered minor and advisory can gradually escalate into full-scale military
involvement. The critics of present United States policy fear a similar
trap; small scale preliminary aid and the placement of advisory person-
nel gradually increasing into a "no return" policy.
17 6
In the geopolitical sphere, the Vietnam analogy illustrates how the
Soviet Union and United States accuse each other of hegemony, expan-
sionism and imperialism, politicizing legal issues. In Nicaragua, the
United States wants to prevent "another Cuba," as they wanted to pre-
vent an undivided communist Vietnam. The loss of another domino
cannot be tolerated. 17 7 Critics of this approach warn, however, that the
United States must learn to differentiate internal civil strife from ag-
gressive international war, and not become involved in defending or
opposing a regime when genuine national interests are absent and in-
ternational law counsels against such intervention.
7 8
A second analogy with reference to United States policy toward
Nicaragua is Cuba. The Cuban revolution of 1959 and Cuba's subse-
quent Marxist orientation were feared by the United States and other
172. See Some Applied History for Central America, N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1983, at
E5, col. 1 (subtitled A Symposium: Vietnam-Era Aides Explore Parallels and Differ-
ences). For a discussion of the Vietnam conflict, see Lobel, The Legality of the United
States Involvement in Vietnam-A Pragmatic Approach, 23 U. MIAMI L. REv. 808
(1969).
173. Some Applied History for Central America, supra note 172. See also supra note
77; Podhoretz, supra note 24.
174. See Some Applied History for Central America, supra note 172.
175. See President Reagan's Address, supra note 11, at 3.
176. See Some Applied History for Central America, supra note 172.
177. Id.
178. See, e.g., Ullman, World Court Evasion, N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1984, at A27, col.
1; supra note 105.
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American states as the first Soviet foothold in the Western Hemi-
sphere, precisely what the Inter-American system was supposed to pre-
vent.17 9 The United States succeeded in ostracizing Cuba in the West-
ern arena, but Cuba nonetheless became a Soviet satellite state. The
United States fears in Nicaragua what has already occurred in Cuba,
another Marxist revolution whose leaders look toward Moscow for ide-
ological and economic support."s' One of the founding principles of the
Inter-American system was the elimination of European and commu-
nist influence. 181 The "loss" of Nicaragua is viewed as a second Soviet
stronghold in the Western Hemisphere.8 2
United States policy toward Cuba has included various strategic
elements. Diplomatically and economically, the United States has at-
tempted to isolate Cuba, in the process terminating a trade relation-
ship which had lasted for years.183 Ideologically, the United States has
tried to expose Cuba as a repressed society.18 4 Militarily, it has at-
tempted several strategic actions, including the Bay of Pigs invasion
and the naval quarantine during the Cuban Missile Crisis.' 85 Critics of
the policy toward Cuba argue that all the United States will gain by
isolating Cuba is a communist Cuba with more resolve, and that if sim-
ilar policies are continued toward Nicaragua, a stronger Sandinista re-
gime with a legitimate anti-United States orientation will result. 88 Ac-
cording to these critics, present United States policies will force the
Sandinistas into the Soviet camp.
A third comparative example of United States intervention in for-
eign civil strife is the Dominican Republic crisis of 1965.187 The Do-
minican Government, while undergoing a communist insurgency de-
clared that it could no longer guarantee the safety of United States
nationals, and requested United States assistance in quelling the
coup. 88 An intervention by United States Marines ensued and the re-
179. See Kissinger Report, supra note 168, at 25. Professor Falk addressed the
United States-Cuba conflict in Falk, American Intervention in Cuba and the Rule of
Law, 22 OHIO ST. L. J. 546 (1961), determining that the United States conduct was "awk-
ward and lawless." Id. at 584.
180. Kissinger Report, supra note 168, at 120.
181. Id. at 13 (referring to the hemispheric commitment to independence and
liberty).
182. Id. at 93.
183. See Falk, supra note 179.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. See Fuentes, supra note 104.
187. See generally THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC CRISIS 1965 (J. Carey ed. 1967).
188. Id. at 7.
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bellion was stopped.189 The protection of United States nationals was
the primary legal rationale given, 90 but subsequently it was admitted
that suppressing the communist uprising and avoiding another Cuba
were important factors in the decision to intervene.' 9'
A major difference between the Dominican Republic crisis and the
present Nicaraguan conflict is that in the former an existing govern-
ment asked for United States assistance, while in the latter the United
States is supporting a rebel force seeking to overthrow a target govern-
ment. The motive, however, is similar. The purpose of arming Nicara-
guan rebels who wish to depose the Sandinista regime is to eliminate a
communist government.19 2 Overt United States intervention in Nicara-
gua could not proceed on a rationale similar to the Dominican inter-
vention because there is no regime asking for assistance. In the Domin-
ican Republic the United States succeeded in stopping an attempted
coup; it feared another regime fashioned after Castro's Cuba. In Nica-
ragua the revolution has already occurred, it is too late for preventive
measures, so the effort now is to harass the supposedly destabilizing
regime.
The assassination of Salvador Allende in Chile in 1973 and the
military coup disposing of the democratically elected communist re-
gime, provide the fourth analogous situation to United States interven-
tion in Nicaragua.193 No formal proof that the United States engi-
neered the fall of Allende has been raised, yet a covert role is plainly
acknowledged. 94 The allegation asserts that the C.I.A. was involved in
agitation and that United States companies gave money to support the
anti-communist press. 195 In Nicaragua, as in Chile, United States ef-
forts to exacerbate internal political strife to the detriment of a legiti-
mate government raise serious legal questions.19 6 Political necessity is
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. Then Secretary of State Dean Rusk stated:
[w]hat began ... as a democratic revolution was taken over by Communist con-
spirators who had been trained for and had carefully planned the operation. Had
they succeeded in establishing a government, the Communist seizure of power
would, in all likelihood, have been irreversible, thus frustrating the declared pur-
poses of the OAS.
Id.
192. See Gerth, supra note 40. The fact that the United States is providing substan-
tial aid to a group of rebels who seek the overthrow of the Sandinistas, and use every
means at their disposal to do so, makes President Reagan's argument that we do not
seek to overthrow the Sandinistas untenable. Id.
193. See M. McDOUGAL & W. REISMAN, supra note 57, at 1022-26.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. See Gerth, supra note 40.
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always available as a policy rationale, but the legality of intervention
through covert aid and destabilizing tactics is questionable under cus-
tomary standards of behavior as well as applicable treaties.19
A final analogy to United States intervention in Nicaragua is the
contemporary situation in Grenada.'9 8 The invasion of Grenada was
waged with the stated purpose of protecting American nationals 99 (in
other words humanitarian intervention), 0 0 and as an affirmative re-
sponse to the plea of the nations of the Organization of Eastern Carib-
bean States for protection from a dangerous neighbor." 1 Another ra-
tionale was to halt the consolidation of a radical leftist government
that seized power in a bloody coup.20 2 As news of the invasion slowly
surfaced, however, additional reasons were revealed.2 0 3 Halting the
build-up of Cuban and Soviet military installations,2°0 foreclosing the
possibility of another hostage crisis and protecting against the loss of
life to United States nationals abroad, as had recently occurred due to
the bombings in Beirut, were major factors in the United States
decision.
205
Factual differences exist between the United States intervention in
Grenada and Nicaragua, but the anti-Cuban and anti-Soviet motive is
identical. 209 The fundamental foreign policy concern is to halt commu-
197. See M. McDouGAL & W. REISMAN, supra note 57, at 1022. Former President
Ford, in responding to a question about the United States role in Chile, stated in a news
conference that "[ilt's a recognized fact that historically as well as presently, such ac-
tions are taken in the best interests of the countries involved." Id.
198. See U.S. Defending Grenada Action Before O.A.S., supra note 162.
199. See Letter to the Editor from Representative Edward Boland, N.Y. Times, Nov.
17, 1983, at A26, col. 3 (subtitled Grenada Invasion: A Legitimate Rescue Mission; Rep-
resentative Boland is Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelli-
gence). For a discussion of the issue of protection of nationals abroad, see Note, Resort
to Force by States to Protect Nationals: The U.S. Rescue Mission to Iran and its Legal-
ity under International Law, 21 VA.. J. Irr'L L. 485 (1981).
200. See supra note 73.
201. Among the members of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States are Gre-
nada, St. Kitts-Nevis, Montserrat, Antigua, St. Lucia, Dominica and St. Vincent. These
nations requested United States aid in responding to the Grenada coup. See Text of
Reagan's Announcement of Invasion, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1983, at A16, col. 1. See also
Taylor, Legality of Grenada Attack Disputed, id., at A19, col. 1. It is noteworthy that
another reason for the Grenada invasion was that Grenada's Governor General, Paul
Scoon, requested United States aid. See U.S. Acts Lawfully, id., May 4, 1984, at A31,
col. 1.
202. See Text of Reagan's Announcement of Invasion, supra note 201.
203. See Gwertzman, Steps to the Invasion: No More 'Paper Tiger,' N.Y. Times,
Oct. 30, 1983, at Al, col. 2.
204. Id.
205. See Steel, Reveling in Military Power, id., Oct. 30, 1983, at E19, col. 1.
206. See Gwertzman, supra note 203.
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nist expansion in the Western Hemisphere.2 7 Grenada illustrates that
at times United States adherence to the doctrine of nonintervention is
diminished due to perceived political imperatives. Many commentators
believe that the effect on the international legal system is
detrimental. 0 8
These examples of United States intervention in foreign civil strife
raise various standards for an assessment of foreign intervention. In
the Dominican Republic and Vietnam, the United States acted at the
request of target states. In Cuba, Grenada and Chile, the United States
acted in response to perceived threats to national and regional inter-
ests. The Grenadian situation raises questions with regard to the suffi-
ciency of evidence needed to justify a claim of necessity in protecting
the lives of United States nationals, and whether invasion of a target
state is justified even at the request of neighboring states.20 9 If United
States intervention can be justified by regional fear and apprehension
of a particular regime, a similar rationale could be used to justify
United States intervention in Nicaragua at the request of Honduras,
Guatemala, El Salvador and Costa Rica.
Argument by analogy in international law is limited by deviating
factual situations. The protection of nationals abroad and the necessity
of providing aid to nation-states for self-defense and regional security
are rationales which have been raised to justify United States interven-
tion in internal strife, perhaps legally.2" On the other hand, interven-
tion in foreign civil strife for the purpose of promoting United States
interests is often without legitimate legal justification.2 1'
ALTERNATIVE SETTLEMENT POSSIBILITIES
International dispute resolution imposes on all parties a duty to
negotiate in good faith and to seek a fair settlement. Given varying
ideological cross-purposes, difficulties abound. In Central America,
United States offers to negotiate have been met by Nicaraguan mis-
207. See The Grenada High, N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1983, at A30, col. 1 (Editorial).
208. See Wicker, Is Nicaragua Next?, id., Oct. 31, 1983, at A14, col. 1. See also
Lewis, President Pyrrhus, id., Oct. 27, 1983, at A31, col. 1.
209. See Boland, supra note 199.
210. Id.; see also J. Carey, supra note 187.
211. The Grenada invasion is an example of intervention with a plausible legal justi-
fication. See Boland, supra note 199. United States intervention in Central America,
however, lacks the clear legal basis (i.e., humanitarian intervention) that Grenada had.
At a recent O.A.S. meeting Mexico's Foreign Minister, Bernardo Sepulveda Amov, stated
that "Grenada cannot become a precedent under any circumstances." See Latin Na-
tions, supra note 162.
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trust, and vice versa.2" 2
The Contadora group has attempted to mediate the Central Amer-
ican conflict.2 " Their proposals have included eliminating outside in-
terference, stopping support of rebel factions and promoting a regional
settlement.21 4 Although the Sandinistas and the United States have
agreed in principle to support the Contadora process, neither has ex-
hibited the willingness to follow through."' The United States has of-
fered its own set of working conditions, as have the Nicaraguans, but
no genuine effort to resolve the conflict has emerged.2"6
212. See Smith, Washington Wary of Peace Feelers From Sandinistas, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 26, 1983, at Al, col. 4. See also Kinzer, Nicaragua's Critics Sense New Air of Give
and Take, id., Nov. 28, 1983, at A17, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Nicaragua's Critics]. But
see Boyd, White House Scorns Peace Offer From Nicaragua, id., Mar. 1, 1985, at A8, col.
1.
213. See Latin Nations, supra note 162. The group would attempt to mediate in the
following manner:
The plan that is being considered is an elaboration of a 21-point peace pro-
gram put forward by the Contadora Group last September.
It would commit the five Central American countries-Costa Rica, El Salva-
dor, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua-to establish democratic systems of
government and to take a number of steps designed to reduce the danger of
military conflict. These steps would include halting imports of new types of
armaments into the region and beginning negotiations on arms reductions, bar-
ring new foreign military installations in the region and dismantling existing in-
stallations within a year, gradually eliminating foreign military advisers, and ab-
staining from supporting groups hostile to the Governments of other countries in
the area.
The agreement would be monitored by a Commission of Verification and
Control composed of four impartial countries, as well as representatives of the
United Nations and the Organization of American States, plus an executive
director.
Latins Offer a Salvador Mediation Plan, N.Y. Times, July 24, 1984, at A3, col. 4.
214. Id.
215. See Nicaragua's Critics, supra note 212.
216. Id. See also Kinzer, Pro-Sandinista Press Spurns Talks, N.Y. Times, Jan. 15,
1984, at A3, col. 1. Offers and counteroffers regarding negotiations have been plentiful,
but no mutually agreeable positions have yet been proffered. See generally New Peace
Effort by Latin Nations Backed by Shultz, id., Mar. 3, 1985, § 1, at 1, col. 6; Anti-
Sandinistas Call for a Dialogue, id., at 14, col. 3; Nicaraguan Says Further Concessions
are Possible, id., at 13, col. 1; Nicaraguan Says Reagan Threats Killed Peace Bid, id.,
Feb. 26, 1985, at A6, col. 1; Amendments May Imperil Latin Pact, id., Nov. 16, 1984, at
A12, col. 1; Latin Peace Plan Will be Revised, id., Oct. 18, 1984, at Al, col. 3; Latin
Peace Plan, id., Oct. 3, 1984, at A3, col. 1 (according to L. Craig Johnston, Deputy Asst.
Sec. of State for Central America, "[tihe draft of the treaty as it stands right now con-
tains all of the right categories of issues, but quite frankly it does not have adequate
verification mechanisms to ensure Nicaraguan compliance"). See Gleijeses, Contadora's
Focus Has 'a Pernicious And Soporific Effect,' id., Apr. 30, 1984, at A15, col. 1.
In a surprise move in September 1984, the Nicaraguan Government agreed to sign
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The proposals of the Kissinger Commission, while offering biparti-
san recommendations, largely support President Reagan's policies and
encourage large scale military aid, as well as general economic aid.
21 7
The Kissinger Report was received negatively by the Sandinistas, as
well as by church groups in Central America. s18 It is doubtful whether
it can provide the necessary framework for a multilateral solution.
CONCLUSION
The issue of the legitimacy of United States intervention in Nica-
ragua is difficult to resolve. The United States asserts that it is not
intervening in Nicaragua, but merely supporting regional self-protec-
tion efforts and seeking to promote the establishment of democratic
institutions in Nicaragua.2 1 0 The Nicaraguans assert that United States
aid to the Contras causes war and civil strife in Nicaragua's northern
and southern regions.2 2 0 Applying objective standards of international
law to present United States measures leads this author to the conclu-
sion that efforts to aid in the defense of legitimate governments, such
as El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, are justifiable under interna-
tional law as long as they remain protective measures. Offensive mea-
sures, such as efforts to destabilize the Nicaraguan regime by aid to
rebels whose major purpose is to overthrow the regime,2 ' are illegalunder international law.
John Mabie
the Contadora treaty as it was then proposed. The Nicaraguans said they "accepted all
the provisions of a treaty proposed by the Contadora group .... The Reagan adminis-
tration, which had supported the treaty," thereafter expressed reservations to the treaty.
See Latin Peace Plan, supra; Shaping them up, ECONOMIST, Oct. 6, 1984, at 20.
"The draft treaty calls for mutual reductions in arms, troops and foreign advisers
among Central American nations, as well as the establishment of fair judicial systems
and the guarantee of civil liberties, including free elections." Treaty Impasse Viewed as
Omen of New U.S.-Nicaragua Tensions, N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1984, at Al, col. 1.
217. See generally Pastor & Feinberg, Redesign Kissinger Economic Proposal, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 18, 1984, at A23, col. 2; Diaz-Alejandro, Kissinger Report: Insider's View, id.
218. See Perlez, Latin Panel's Soviet Finding Is Challenged by Moynihan, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 13, 1984 at AS, col. 5. See also Schlesinger, Failings of the Kissinger Report,
id., Jan. 17, 1984, at A25, col. 2.
219. See President Reagan's Address, supra note 11.
220. See Mercado, supra note 26; see also Schlender, supra note 16.
221. See Rebels, supra note 113.
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